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Abstract
I survey the inﬂuence of Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal paper in the ﬁeld of Interna-
tional Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its
implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international
trade ﬂows. I also review empirical work suggestive of the empirical relevance of the property-
rights theory. Along the way, I develop novel theoretical results and also outline some of the
key limitations of existing contributions.
∗This survey was prepared for the “Grossman and Hart at 25” conference held in Brussels on June 24-26, 2011. I
am grateful to Lucia Antras, Davin Chor, Arnaud Costinot, Oliver Hart, and an anonymous referee for very helpful
comments and to Elhanan Helpman for many conversations on this topic over the years. I am also grateful to Davin
Chor, Federico D´ ıez, Nathan Nunn, Heiwai Tang, and Dan Treﬂer for kindly sharing their data with me, and to
Ruiqing Cao for excellent research assistance.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1986, the year of publication of Sandy Grossman and Oliver Hart’s seminal paper on the bound-
aries of the ﬁrm, the state of the art mobile phone, the Motorola DynaTAC 8000x, resembled a
large brick, weighed close to two pounds, and was sold at $3,995 a piece (or a whopping $8,235 in
current U.S. dollars). That same year, IBM released its ﬁrst laptop computer, the 13-pound IBM
PC Convertible, featuring an Intel 80C88 CPU that ran at 4.77MHz, 256 kBytes of RAM, and a
narrow 10-inch LCD screen, all for ‘just’ $2,000 (or the equivalent of $3,820 today).
The last twenty ﬁve years have witnessed an information and communication technology (ICT)
revolution that has transformed the world economy. The exponential growth in the processing power
and memory capacity of computers (as exempliﬁed by Moore’s law) and the equally exponential
growth in the network capacity of optical ﬁber have led to a dramatic fall in the cost of processing
and transmitting information at long distances. One of the manifestations of this ICT revolution
has been the gradual disintegration of production processes (or ‘slicing of the value chain’) across
borders. More and more ﬁrms now organize production on a global scale and choose to oﬀshore
parts, components or services to producers in foreign and often distant countries.
Although this trend is signiﬁcant enough to be salient in aggregate statistics, it is often best
illustrated through particular examples.1 Apple’s iPad 2 tablet is a case in point. Its slim and
sleek exterior hides a complex manufacturing process combining components provided by multiplier
suppliers located in various countries. Apple does not disclose information on its input providers,
but teardown reports (such as those published by isuppli.com and iﬁxit.com) have shed light on the
global nature of the iPad 2 production process. The tablet itself is assembled in China (and by the
end of 2011 also in Brazil) by Taiwan-based Foxconn. The displays are believed to be manufactured
by LG Display and, more recently, by Samsung, both of which are based in South Korea. The
distinctive touch panel is produced by Wintek, a Taiwan-based company that also owns plants
in China, India and Vietnam, while the case is provided by another Taiwanese company, Catcher
Technologies, with operations in Taiwan and China. A third important component, the battery
pack, also originates in Taiwan and is sold by Simplo Technologies and Dynapack International.
Apart from these easily identiﬁable parts, the iPad 2 incorporates a variety of chips and other small
technical components provided by various ﬁrms with R&D centers in developed economies and
manufacturing plants (under various organizational structures) worldwide. A non-exhaustive list
includes (again) Korea’s Samsung, which is believed to manufacture the main processor (designed
by Apple) and possibly the ﬂash memory, Japan’s Elpida contributing the SDRAM, Germany’s
Inﬁneon and U.S. Qualcomm both supplying 3G modules, and Italo-French STMicroelectronics,
Japan’s AKM Superconductors and U.S. TAOS each contributing key sensors.
When designing their global sourcing strategies, one of the key organizational decisions faced
by ﬁrms concerns the extent of control they want to exert over their foreign production processes.
1For aggregate evidence on the increase in vertical fragmentation, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Campa and
Goldberg (1997), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001). This trend also featured prominently in the WTO’s
2008 World Trade Report.
1Ownership of foreign assets is one of the key methods to enhance such control as exempliﬁed by
Intel’s decision in 1997 to oﬀshore a signiﬁcant part of its worldwide production of microprocessors
to a $300-million wholly-owned manufacturing plant in Costa Rica. Other ﬁrms, such as Nike or
Apple, also rely heavily on oﬀshore manufacturing, but choose to subcontract production to non-
aﬃliated producers around the world, while keeping within ﬁrm boundaries only the design and
marketing stages of production.
Why do some ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to exert a tight control over their foreign production oper-
ations while others choose not to do so? Or paraphrasing the opening sentences of Grossman and
Hart’s 1986 article (referred to as GH, hereafter), “what is a multinational ﬁrm? And what are
the determinants of how vertically or laterally integrated the activities of the multinational ﬁrm
are?” The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of recent literature in international trade
that has attempted to provide answers to these questions by applying some of the insights of the
inﬂuential property-rights theory ﬁrst exposited in GH and further developed in Hart and Moore
(1990) and Hart (1995).
The relevance of incomplete-contracting theories of integration is not particularly diﬃcult to
motivate in international environments in which goods or services are exchanged across borders.
Global production networks necessarily entail contracting relationships between agents located
in countries with heterogeneous legal systems and contracting institutions.2 A natural diﬃculty
in contract disputes involving international transactions is determining which country’s laws are
applicable to the contract being signed. Even when they are competent (in a legal sense), local
courts may be reluctant to enforce a contract involving residents of foreign countries, especially
if such enforcement would entail an unfavorable outcome for local residents. Although there have
been coordinated attempts to reduce the contractual uncertainties and ambiguities associated with
international transactions, such as the signing of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), many countries have opted out of these agreements
(most notably, the United Kingdom). Other forms of arbitration, such as those provided by the
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, are also available but are rarely used in practice.
The limited amount of repeated interactions and lack of collective punishment mechanisms often
associated with international transactions also makes implicit contracts less sustainable in those
environments. As summarized by Rodrik (2000) “ultimately, [international] contracts are often
neither explicit nor implicit; they simply remain incomplete.”
The detrimental eﬀects of imperfect contract enforcement on international trade ﬂows are par-
ticularly acute in transactions involving intermediate inputs, as those tend to be associated with
longer time lags between the time the order is placed (and the contract is signed) and the time
the goods or services are delivered (and the contract executed), and they also often entail signiﬁ-
cant relationship-speciﬁc investments and other sources of lock-in on the part of both buyers and
suppliers. For instance, suppliers often tailor their manufacturing production to the needs of par-
2As an example, Djankov et al. (2003) document that the total duration of a legal procedure aimed at collecting
a bounced check ranges from 7 days in Tunisia to 1003 in Slovenia.
2ticular buyers and have diﬃculty placing those goods in world markets should the buyer decide not
to abide by the terms of the contract. Similarly, buyers undertake signiﬁcant investments whose
value can be severely diminished by incompatibilities, production line delays or quality debasements
associated with suppliers not following through with their contractual obligations.
In Poorly Made in China, Paul Midler describes his misadventures as an oﬀshoring consultant in
China, where his command of Chinese made him a valuable asset for American companies seeking
suppliers in that country. Midler describes numerous last-minute pricing maneuvers and clever
manipulations of quality undertaken by Chinese suppliers, attempting to extract more surplus from
the Western buyers they transact with.3 As Midler puts it, “‘Price go up!’ was the resounding
chorus heard across the manufacturing sector (p. 184),” which is very much reminiscent of the
classical hold-up problem modelled in GH. Furthermore, Midler illustrates how potential solutions
to this hold-up problem tend to be ineﬀective in China. For instance, relational contracting does
not appear to diminish the frustrations of Western companies, and if anything, tends to increase
them, something he labels the “Reverse Frequent Flyer” eﬀect. Furthermore, and consistently with
one of the fundamental assumptions in GH, ownership of Chinese suppliers does not eliminate
opportunistic behavior on the part of these producers, or as he puts it, there is no “Joint Venture
Panacea”.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections and a ﬁnal section with concluding
remarks. In section 2, I develop a variant of the partial equilibrium framework in GH, along
the lines of Antr` as (2003), which has served as the basis for most applications of the property-
rights theory in international environments. While the literature has generally assumed particular
functional forms to derive results on the key determinants of the integration decision, I show that
some of the key predictions of the model are robust to more general assumptions on preferences
and technology. Later in the section, I outline several extensions of this framework that have been
developed in the literature, including the introduction of liquidity constraints, multiple suppliers,
partial contractibility and productivity heterogeneity across ﬁrms.
In section 3, I summarize diﬀerent ways in which this partial-equilibrium property-rights model
has been adapted in general-equilibrium, open-economy environments. Even restricting oneself
to partial-equilibrium environments, considering the location of diﬀerent parts of the production
process signiﬁcantly complicates the organizational decisions of ﬁrms. It is thus natural that the lit-
erature has largely focused on simple environments with either a limited number of countries (often
two) or with particularly convenient symmetry assumptions across ﬁrms and countries. As a payoﬀ
to these simpliﬁcations, these frameworks deliver sharp implications for how the organizational
decisions of ﬁrms aggregate up to easily observable statistics, such as the intraﬁrm component of
international trade across sectors and countries. I argue, however, that future contributions should
incorporate more realistic features, particularly when the goal is to develop theoretical frameworks
that guide empirical analysis using ﬁrm-level data.
3The lack of enforceability of contracts is illustrated by the Chinese old saying that “signing a contract is simply
a ﬁr s ts t e pi nn e g o t i a t i o n s . ”
3The empirical implementation of open-economy p r o p e r t y - r i g h t sf r a m e w o r k si sp r e c i s e l yt h e
focus of section 4. Empirically validating the property-rights theory poses at least two important
challenges. First, the theory’s predictions are associated with subtle characteristics of marginal
returns to investments that are generally unobservable in the data (see Whinston, 2003). Second,
data on the integration decisions of ﬁrms are not readily available. Admittedly, the international
trade literature has not made an awful lot of progress addressing the ﬁrst concern (although it
has not ignored it). Conversely, data on international transactions are particularly accessible due
to the existence of oﬃcial records of goods crossing borders. Furthermore, some countries collect
detailed data on whether international trade ﬂows involve related parties or non-related parties,
thus generating hundreds of thousands of observations per year describing the relative prevalence
of integration across products and countries. In section 4, I describe the rich variation observed in
U.S. intraﬁrm import data and explicitly discuss the pros and cons of using this source of data to
test the property-rights theory. I also review several papers in the empirical literature on intraﬁrm
trade by graphically illustrating their key ﬁndings and how they have been interpreted in light of
the GH framework. Finally, I brieﬂy discuss a few recent contributions using international ﬁrm-level
data sources and suggest some avenues for future research.
In section 5, I oﬀer some concluding remarks and outline the broader inﬂuence of GH in the
ﬁeld of international trade.
Before proceeding any further, it is important to mention some topics that are omitted in
this survey. First, it should be emphasized that GH’s property-rights approach has not been the
only theory of the ﬁrm applied to understand multinational ﬁrm boundaries. The literature has
understood since Hymer’s (1960) seminal Ph.D. thesis that the issue of control is essential to
understanding the nature of the multinational ﬁrm, and several early contributions adopted the
transaction-cost approach of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985) to shed light on some of
the key determinants of the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrm.4 The ﬁrst general-equilibrium
implementation of the transaction-cost approach is due to Ethier (1986), with important subsequent
contributions by Ethier and Markusen (1996), McLaren (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2003).5 Second, the international trade literature has also concerned itself with other organizational
decisions of multinational ﬁrms, such as the allocation of decision rights among employees and the
optimal compensation of worker eﬀort. For instance, Marin and Verdier (2009) and Puga and Treﬂer
(2010) have applied the Aghion and Tirole (1997) authority framework in general-equilibrium, open-
economy environments, while Grossman and Helpman (2004) have studied how optimal incentive
schemes interact with multinational ﬁrm boundaries. Reviewing these contributions in detail is
outside the scope of this paper, though I will touch upon them towards the end of section 3.6
Similarly, I will refrain from delving into the foundations of incomplete contracting frameworks
4See, among others, Casson (1979), Dunning (1981) or Rugman (1981).
5See also Qiu and Spencer (2002) and Chen and Feenstra (2008) for related frameworks. As a curiosity, Ethier’s
(1986) article cites a 1984 working paper version of GH, and thus appears to be the ﬁrst published paper in interna-
tional trade to cite GH.
6These topics have been treated in some detail in surveys by Markusen (1995), Spencer (2005), Helpman (2006),
and Antr` as and Rossi-Hansberg (2009), as well as in the classic book by Caves (1996).
4since this is not more of an issue in open-economy environments than it is in closed-economy ones,
and since it has been discussed in depth elsewhere in the literature (see, for instance, the articles
in the 1999 Symposium in the Review of Economic Studies).
2 A Property-Rights Model
In this section, I develop a simple variant of GH along the lines of Antr` as (2003).
2.1 Model Setup
Environment Consider a situation in which only the manager of a ﬁrm  has access to a technol-
ogy for converting a specialized intermediate input or component  into a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good.
The manager  is also in charge of providing headquarter services , which raise the marginal prod-
uct of . Given an amount  of components and an amount  of headquarter services, sale revenue
is given by ()w i t h  0,   0,   0,   0,   0, and (0) = (0)=0 .
The manager  needs to contract with an operator of a manufacturing plant (denoted by )f o rt h e
provision of . Production of  and  require investments on the part of  and , respectively. 
obtains 1 units of  for each unit of investment, while  obtains 1 units of  for each unit of
investment. Investments are made simultaneously at some date  = 1 and the inputs are obtained
at a later date  = 2. The inputs are tailored speciﬁcally to the other party in the transaction
and are useless or incompatible in alternative production processes.7 Finally,  converts inputs 
and  into the ﬁnal good at a ﬁnal date  = 3. For simplicity, agents do not discount the future
between  =1a n d =3 .
Contracting The managers  and  get together at some initial stage  = 0 to negotiate a
contract. As in GH, before investments in  and  are made, the only contractibles are the
allocation of residual rights (i.e., the ownership structure) and a lump-sum transfer between the
two parties.8 I will consider below more general environments in which contracts on a wider set of
variables are enforceable. Without a binding contract detailing the terms of exchange, parties are
left to negotiate these terms (i.e., a payment by  to  for the provision of ) after these inputs
have been produced at stage  = 2. As in GH, it is assumed that this ex-post agreement is fully
enforceable, that  and  have symmetric information at that stage, and that the negotiation
outcome can be approximated by the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. The signiﬁcance and
ramiﬁcations of these assumptions have been discuss e da tl e n g t hi nt h el i t e r a t u r e ,a n da l t h o u g h
7Of course, partial relationship-speciﬁcity would suﬃce for the results. Furthermore ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs e a r c h
frictions or time-to-build constraints, a lock-in eﬀect might arise even in the absence of customization of inputs, as
producers might be unable to costlessly combine their inputs with those of other producers.
8In practice, contractual disputes are often triggered by concerns about substandard quality of inputs or incom-
patibilities of these inputs with other parts of the production process, both of which are seldom veriﬁable by third
parties. Furthermore, the particular nature of the required investments in  and  might be diﬃcult to specify in a
comprehensive contract.
5they remain controversial, they continue to be standard in the literature.9
Property Rights and Bargaining Power Following GH’s property-rights approach to the
theory of the ﬁrm, and contrary to the Coase-Williamson approach, it is assumed that the space
of contracts and the nature of the ex-post negotiations between  and  are independent of
the ownership structure decision at stage  = 0. The ex-post distribution of surplus is, however,
sensitive to the chosen organizational structure. To see this, notice that given our assumptions,
when  and  remain unaﬃliated entities, a case I shall refer to throughout as outsourcing,a
contractual termination leaves both agents with a zero payoﬀ because the inputs are useless unless
combined together. In this framework the same would be true if  were to integrate  because ’s
human capital has been assumed essential for the production of the ﬁnal good. For this reason, and
because it does not appear to feature prominently in the data, I hereafter abstract from considering
the possibility of (forward) integration of  by . The case of backwards integration, which I refer
to throughout simply as integration, is more consequential. This is because when  integrates the
production of ,i te ﬀectively purchases the residual rights of control over this input. As a result,
if  refuses to trade after these inputs have been produced,  now has the option of selectively
ﬁring  and seizing the amount of  already produced. To ensure positive ex-post gains from
trade, it is assumed, however, that  cannot use the input without  as eﬀectively as it can with
the cooperation of ,s oﬁring  results in a loss of a fraction 1 −  in sale revenue.
Discussion At this point, it may be useful to compare the assumptions I have made with those
in GH. First, note that the above framework is more general than GH in two respects: it allows
investments to be complementary in creating surplus and it also considers the possibility that one
agent’s investments might aﬀect the other agent’s disagreement payoﬀs, thereby avoiding the need
to narrowly interpret investments as being human capital investments. As pointed out by Whinston
(2003), these features are indispensable in order to be able to comfortably use the model to interpret
integration decisions in the real world.
Despite these generalizations, it should be clear that the above framework is more restrictive
than GH in at least three dimensions. First, ownership of physical assets (buildings, machines) has
been associated above with ownership of the inputs that are produced with those assets. This is a
narrow interpretation of the role of asset ownership, but it is a useful assumption to make when one
is trying to simplify the exposition of the partial-equilibrium side of the model. Second, although
in principle the parties could agree at  = 0 on the allocation of ownership rights over two assets (
and ), as pointed out above it is never optimal to allocate ownership rights over  to . Again,
this is largely an expositional assumption that draws attention away from situations that do not
appear essential in general equilibrium, open-economy applications of the GH framework. Third,
the model above places much more structure on how investments aﬀect inside and outside options
than the original GH framework does. To be more precise, given the assumptions above, the payoﬀs
9Following GH, I assume that both agents have symmetric primitive bargaining in the ex-post negotiations. The
international trade literature has for the most part considered the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
6obtained by  and  in the ex-post bargaining are proportional to a common aggregator of  and
, with the ownership structure decision simply aﬀecting the shares obtained by each agent. In
particular,  obtains a fraction  of revenue ()a n d obtains the remaining 1−,w h e r e
 =
(
 = 1
2 if  outsources to 
 =  + 1
2 (1 − )i f  integrates 
 (1)
Obviously, this is a signiﬁcant point of departure from GH, but as I will shortly demonstrate, it
will deliver a particularly sharp representation of one of the key insights from the property-rights
theory, while sidestepping Whinston’s (2003) criticism about the robustness of GH’s insights to the
presence of complementary investments.
Formulation of the Problem Having discussed our assumptions, I next oﬀer a succinct for-
mulation of the “organizational problem” solved by  and . Notice that given the existence of
ex-ante transfers, ﬁrms will agree at  = 0 on the ownership structure (outsourcing or integration)
that maximizes the joint payoﬀ of  and . This surplus is of course aﬀected by the investments
in  and  undertaken by  and ; these investments are chosen simultaneously and noncooper-
atively by these two agents at  = 1 with the aim of maximizing their ex-post payoﬀsa t =2 .I n
sum, the key organizational decision  ∈ {} —  for vertical integration and  for outsourcing
—s o l v e s
max
∈{}
 = ( ) −  ·  −  · 
  =a r gm a x

{() −  · } (P1)
 =a r gm a x
 {(1 − )() −  · } ,
where  i sg i v e ni n( 1 ) .
2.2 Characterization
Notice that program (P1) boils down to choosing a value of  ∈ { } to maximize joint proﬁts.
As suggested by Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008), a pedagogically useful way to characterize the
optimal choice of ownership structure is to consider the hypothetical case in which  and  could
freely choose  from the continuum of values in [01]. Intuitively, integration will tend to be more
attractive in situations in which the joint-proﬁt maximizing share of surplus accruing to  is large,
while outsourcing will tend to be preferred when this share is low.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of the objective function in (P1) delivers


=(  − )


+(  − )


 (2)
which, plugging the ﬁrst-order condition associated with the constraints in (P1) and setting  =
70 delivers the following joint-proﬁt maximizing division of surplus ∗:
∗
1 − ∗ =
 · 
 ·
¡
−
¢ (3)
where  ≡  is the elasticity of surplus to investments in input  =  and  ≡



 is
the elasticity of investment in  to changes in the distribution of surplus . In words, equation (3)
implies that:10
Proposition 1 The (hypothetical) optimal share of revenue allocated to an agent is increasing in
the elasticity of revenue with respect to that agent’s investment and in the elasticity of that agent’s
investment with respect to changes in the distribution of surplus.
Because in the property-rights theory the only way to shift surplus between agents is via the
allocation of ownership rights, the ﬁr s tr e s u l ta b o v ei sr e m i n i s c e n to fo n eo ft h ek e yr e s u l t si nG H ,
namely that ex-ante eﬃciency dictates that ownership of assets, and thus residual rights of control,
should be assigned to the party whose investment contributes relatively more to the value of the
relationship. The relative importance of an agent’s investment is captured here by the elasticity of
revenue with respect to that agent’s investment.
Equation (3) highlights, however, that the responsiveness of investments to changes in bar-
gaining power is also an important determinant of the ownership decision. What determines this
responsiveness? One might worry that if this elasticity depends on the division of surplus  and on
features of the revenue function, the overall eﬀects of the revenue elasticities  and  might
be less clear-cut than as suggested in equation (3). Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions
associated with the constraints in program (P1) we indeed ﬁnd that
 =
− (1 − ) − 
(1 − )
³
 − ()
2
´;( 4 )
 =
 +  (1 − )
(1 − )
³
 − ()
2
´.( 5 )
These equations indicate that the optimal division of surplus, and thus the optimal allocation of
ownership rights, depends on subtle properties of the revenue function (), not just on its
partial derivatives.11 Although as pointed out above the assumptions we have made about how
investments aﬀect inside and outside options are rather restrictive, these results resonate with those
exposited by Whinston (2003).
10I choose to represent equation (3) in terms of elasticities rather than in terms of marginal returns and marginal
eﬀects on investment, i.e.,
∗
1−∗ =
·()
·(−), to facilitate a comparison with previous results derived in the
literature and discussed below.
11Note that even the eﬀect of  on investments is of ambiguous sign. The denominator in (4) and (5) is necessarily
positive if the second-order conditions for the choice of  and  in a complete contracting environment are to be
met, but the sign of the numerators is shaped by the relative concavity and complementarity of ().
8To make some progress, the literature has typically assumed particular functional forms for the
revenue function (). A particularly widely used formulation, starting with the work of Antr` as
(2003), is to assume
()=,( 6 )
with 0, 0    1, 0    1, and  +   1. This speciﬁcation may seem ad hoc,
but it follows directly from two assumptions that are fairly common in modern international trade
models, namely that preferences feature a constant-elasticity of substitution across varieties within
an industry (c.f., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and that inputs are combined in production according
to a Cobb-Douglas technology (see section 3 for more details). It may be argued that the Cobb-
Douglas assumption is particularly restrictive so I will address this concern below. In any case,
with the revenue function in (6), the revenue elasticities  and  are pinned down by the
parameters  and , respectively, and the ratio of elasticities  turns out to depend only
on these parameters as well. Equation (3) then takes a particularly simple form:
∗
1 − ∗ =
s
(1 − )
(1 − )
 (7)
I will associate throughout the parameters  and with the terms headquarter intensity and
component intensity, respectively. It is then clear from equation (7) that the joint-proﬁt maximiz-
ing share of revenue assigned to an agent is increasing in the relative importance of that agent’s
investment, as measured by the elasticity of revenue to that investment. In terms of the choice of
ownership structure, this isoelastic example delivers the following sharp result (see, for instance,
Antr` as and Helpman, 2008, for a proof):
Proposition 2 Let ﬁrm revenues be given by (6) and let  =  and  = (1 − ),w i t h
0 1 and 0 1. Then there exists a unique threshold ˆ  ∈ (01) such that for all ˆ ,
integration dominates outsourcing (or ∗ =  ), while for ˆ , outsourcing dominates integration
(or ∗ = ). Furthermore, the threshold ˆ  is independent of the cost parameters  and .
Hence, integration is optimal for headquarter intensities above (or component intensities below)
a given threshold, while outsourcing is chosen for headquarter intensities below (or component
intensities above) that threshold.
Even though the speciﬁcation in (6) has been widely used in the literature, one might still be
concerned that the results in Proposition 2 heavily rely on the Cobb-Douglas assumption implicit
in (6). It can be shown, however, that the result readily generalizes to the case in which the revenue
function is a general homogenous of degree  ∈ (01) in  and .12 In the Appendix, it is shown
12This would the case, for instance, if the inverse demand faced by the ﬁnal-good producer is homogenous of
degree  −1  0 in output — as with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences — and the production function combining  and  is
homogenenous of degree  ∈ (01]. In such a case, we would have  = .
9that in that case, equation (3) simpliﬁes to:
∗
1 − ∗ =
s



¡
1 − 
¢
+( 1− )( − 1)

¡
1 − 
¢
+( 1− )( − 1)
 (8)
where  and  again denote the revenue elasticities of headquarter services and components,
respectively, and  is the elasticity of substitution between headquarter services  and the input
 in revenue. Simple diﬀerentiation then conﬁrms that for any constant   0, ∗ continues to
be increasing in  and decreasing in , and as a result it continues to be eﬃcient to allocate
residual rights of control and thus “power” to the party whose investment has a relatively larger
impact on surplus.13 In other words, the prediction of the model that integration is more attractive
in headquarter-intensive sectors than in component-intensive sectors appears robust.
2.3 Extensions
Before discussing the open-economy implementation of the above model, I brieﬂy describe some of
the extensions of the benchmark model above that have been considered in the literature. These
extensions have been developed in open-economy, general-equilibrium environments, but it is more
convenient to discuss them here and refer back to them in section 3. For simplicity, I develop these
extensions one at a time, though they could be readily incorporated in a uniﬁed framework. Also,
I focus throughout on revenue functions akin to equation (6), which implicitly assume that  faces
a demand schedule with a constant price elasticity and that headquarter services and the bundle
of supplier inputs feature a unit elasticity of substitution. Presumably, the results I am about to
discuss would still hold under more general environments (such as those discussed at the end of the
previous section), but I will not attempt to verify this here.
A. Financial Constraints
Following GH, I have assumed so far that the choice of organizational form is always ex ante
eﬃcient, in the sense that, at  = 0, both parties can freely exchange lump-sum transfers and this
ensures that a joint-proﬁt maximizing ownership structure is chosen. In practice, however, it is
not clear that ﬁrms can easily resort to nondistortionary transfers in their initial negotiations. For
instance, some ﬁrms might be ﬁnancially constrained and might have diﬃculties raising the amount
of cash that would be needed to compensate their counterparty for choosing a particular ownership
structure, and this may lead to an ineﬃcient choice of organizational form. I next build on Basco
(2010) to illustrate how ﬁnancial constraints shape the choice of ownership structure within the
version of GH developed above. A more complete treatment of how liquidity constraints shape
organizational choices in other variants of the GH model can be found in Aghion and Tirole (1994),
Legros and Newman (2008) and Carluccio and Fally (forthcoming).
13It should be noted that if the revenue function does not feature a constant elasticity of substitution between 
and ,t h e n will of course be endogenous to the parameters of the model.
10In anticipation of the market structure discussed below in section 3, I focus on situations in
which  has full bargaining power ex-ante (that is,  makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to )a n d
the initial contract calls for a positive transfer from  to . The key new feature is that  is
now assumed to only be able to pledge to external ﬁnanciers at most a share  of the income
it receives from transacting with ,w h i c hr e m e m b e ri sg i v e nb y( 1 − )( ) −  · 
under organizational mode  ∈ {}.14 When ﬁnancial constraints bind, the optimal ownership
structure from the point of view of  now solves program (P1) but with the objective function now
given by
 = ( ) −  + [(1 − )() − ]. (9)
Following the same steps as in section (2.2), we ﬁnd that the (hypothetical) proﬁt maximizing
division of surplus ∗ for  is given by
∗
1 − ∗ = 
 · 
 ·
¡
−
¢ +( 1− )
∗
1 − ∗
1
 ·
¡
−
¢,
which naturally reduces to (3) when  =1a n dﬁnancial constraints disappear. When the revenue
function further has the isoelastic form in (6), we can use equations (4) and (5) to obtain:
∗
1 − ∗ = 


(1 − ∗) − 
∗ − 
+( 1− )
µ


(1 − ∗) − 
∗ − 
+
1 − 

¶
. (10)
A few things are worth highlighting about equation (10). First, and quite obviously, we have
that when  =1 ,ﬁnancial constraints disappear and (10) simpliﬁes to (7). Second, note that the
right-hand-side is a weighted sum of two decreasing functions of ∗, with the weights being  and
1 − , and with the second term being necessarily higher than the ﬁrst one. This immediately
implies that ∗ is necessarily higher the lower is . In words, the desired division of surplus is more
tilted towards , the tighter are ﬁnancial constraints, reﬂecting the fact that  now uses integration
not only to balance incentives but also to extract surplus from . Third, and in a related manner,
the optimal share of ex-post surplus accruing to  is positive even when headquarter intensity
is negligible, i.e., ∗ =( 1− )(1− )(1 − (1 − ))  0w h e n = 0. Finally, it is easily
veriﬁed that the positive eﬀect of  and negative eﬀect of  on the proﬁt-maximizing value
division of surplus ∗ continues to hold for any value of  ∈ (01].15
As in the model without ﬁnancial constraints, one can show that there continues to exist a
14For consistency with the other parts of the model, one should not interpret this ﬁnancial contract as a revenue-
sharing agreement, because sale revenues are assumed to be noncontractible. A typical way to rationalize this
formulation of credit constraints is to introduce limited commitment on the part of the supplier; if the supplier can
default on external investors and still retain a share of sale revenue, then the size of the initial loan will indeed be
proportional to expected revenue.
15Only in the limiting case  → 0, when  has no ability to transfer cash to  a ts t a g e0 ,w eh a v et h a t
∗ → 1−,
and the eﬀect of headquarter intensity vanishes. The intuition behind this result is that when  =0 ,t h eo b j e c t i v e
function of  coincides with that in the ﬁrst constraint of program (P1). Hence, the eﬀect of changes in  working
through the choice of input  have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on ’s choice of ownership structure. Of course,  could still
aﬀect ’s proﬁts via its eﬀects on ’s choice of input , but the latter eﬀect turns out to be zero with the isoelastic
revenue function in (6).
11headquarter-intensity cutoﬀ ˆ  ∈ [01) such that for all   ˆ , integration dominates outsourcing
(or ∗ =  ), while outsourcing dominates integration (or ∗ = )f o r  ˆ  whenever ˆ   0.
The key new features brought about by ﬁnancial constraints are (see the Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 3 The cutoﬀ ˆ  is lower the larger is , implying that integration is more prevalent
the tighter the ﬁnancial constraints. Furthermore, for large enough , integration may be optimal
for any value of  ∈ (01), i.e., ˆ  =0 .
As in the model without ﬁnancial frictions, I show in the Appendix that ˆ  is decreasing in ,
and thus integration continues to be more prevalent, the less important are supplier investments.
B. Multiple Suppliers
So far, I have focused on situations in which  is concerned only with the provision of one input.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) consider a more realistic environment in which production requires multiple
intermediate inputs. Although their framework does not allow for headquarter services it is straight-
forward to incorporate them into the analysis. With that in mind, suppose that the environment
is as before, but ’s production process now entails the combination of headquarter services and a
unit measure of components, each provided by a diﬀerent manager. Denote by m ≡{()}∈[01]
the (inﬁnitely-dimensional) vector of investments by suppliers. I impose the following functional
form, which will serve to illustrate the role of input substitutability on the integration decision:
(m)=
µZ 1
0
()
¶

. (11)
A few comments are in order. First, equation (11) is a direct generalization of the speciﬁcation
in (6), with  being now replaced by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregator of
the continuum of inputs. Second, the new parameter  ∈ (01) governs the substitutability of
the diﬀerent inputs provided by suppliers; when  → 1, these inputs become perfect substitutes,
while when  → 0, they are all essential in production. Third, equation (11) imposes complete
symmetry across production stages, both in terms of substitutability patterns as well as in terms of
the importance of these suppliers’ investments in production. It would be interesting to incorporate
asymmetries into the framework, but I shall not attempt to do so here.
As before, the initial contract between  and its suppliers only includes an organizational
structure (that is, which suppliers are integrated and which are not) and a set of lump-sum transfers
across agents, on which I place no constraints in this section. Without a binding contract governing
the ex-post trade in inputs, the agents in the model are left to (multilaterally) bargain over the
division of surplus at  = 2, when the inputs have been produced. Despite being inﬁnitesimally
small, individual suppliers can use the threat of withholding their respective inputs from  to
extract surplus. Acemoglu et al. (2007) follow Hart and Moore (1990) in using the Shapley value
to determine the division of ex post surplus between  and its suppliers.16 It can be veriﬁed that,
16A complication arises from the fact that we now have a continuum of agents bargaining over surplus. Acemoglu
12in a symmetric equilibrium in which no supplier is integrated, a particular supplier’s  payoﬀ in the
ex-post bargaining is given by (see the Appendix):
 ((−)()) =

 + 
(−)

µ
()
(−)
¶
=

 + 
(m), (12)
where (−) represents the (symmetric) investments of all suppliers other than  and where in the
second equality we have used the fact that supplier investments will be symmetric in equilibrium.
The ﬁnal-good manager  then captures the residual share ( + ) of revenue. Notice that the
more substitutable are inputs in production (the higher is ), the lower is the share of revenues
that accrues to suppliers, as their ability to hold up  is lower in that case.
Consider next the polar case in which all suppliers are integrated by . Assume that in such a
case, suppliers cannot withhold the full value of their marginal contribution to revenue, but only a
share 1−, as in our benchmark model above.17 This results in  =2p a y o ﬀs for suppliers equal to
 [(−)()] =
 (1 − )
 + 
(−)

µ
()
(−)
¶
=
 (1 − )
 + 
(m), (13)
leaving  with the residual share ( + )( + ) of revenue.
Solving for all suppliers’ production levels as well as ’s provision of headquarter services, one
c a no b t a i nj o i n tp r o ﬁts of  and all suppliers in terms of the parameters of the model, including ,
,a n d, and the ownership structure decision as captured by . Even in the presence of multiple
suppliers, it can be shown again that the ratio of joint proﬁts under integration relative to those
under outsourcing continue to be increasing in the relative importance of headquarter services
as captured by , and thus integration is again predicted to be more prevalent in headquarter
intensive sectors.18 The main new result that emerges from the modelling of multiple suppliers
is the following role of input substitutability in shaping the integration decisions of  (see the
Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 4 There exists a unique threshold ˆ  ∈ (01) such that for all ˆ , integration of
all suppliers dominates outsourcing, while for ˆ , outsourcing dominates integration. Hence,
integration is more prevalent the higher the complementarity (or the lower the substitutability)
across supplier inputs.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When there is a high degree of technological
complementarity across inputs, the ex-post payoﬀ of  under outsourcing tends to be relatively
et al. (2007) resolve this issue by considering a discrete-player version of the game and computing the asymptotic
Shapley value of Robert J. Aumann and Shapley (1974).
17Acemoglu et al. (2007) consider an alternative formulation in which suppliers withhold a share 1 −  of their in-
termediate input. This generates analogous predictions for how input substitutability shapes the integration decision,
but the proofs are much more cumbersome in that case.
18Conversely, the eﬀect of  on the relative proﬁtability of integration and outso u r c i n gi sl e s sc l e a r - c u t . T h e
reason for this is that as  goes down, the relative importance of suppliers’ investment goes down, but their
bargaining strength is also diminished, thereby aggravating the hold-up problem. It can be shown, however, that in
the neighborhood of  → 0, integration is necessarily more proﬁtable than outsourcing.
13low (note, in particular, that ’s payoﬀ under outsourcing is 0 when  → 0) and the choice of
headquarter services is particularly distorted. In such cases, vertical integration is particularly
attractive because it helps restore the incentives of  to provide these headquarter services. Con-
versely, when  is high, suppliers face a particularly acute hold-up problem since their inputs are
highly substitutable with each other; in those situations, strengthening the bargaining power of
suppliers via an outsourcing contract constitutes the proﬁt-maximizing organizational mode.
The variant of the model with multiple suppliers that I have developed assumes that all stages
of production are performed simultaneously and that  negotiates with all suppliers also simulta-
neously. Antr` as and Chor (2011) consider the case in which the production process is sequential in
nature and the relationship-speciﬁc investments made by suppliers in upstream stages can aﬀect the
incentives of parties involved in later downstream stages. As a result, they show that  might have
diﬀerential incentives to integrate suppliers along the value chain, and might end up outsourcing
some inputs and integrating others, even when the production function treats these inputs sym-
metrically as in (11). In other words, the “downstreamness” of an input becomes a determinant of
the ownership structure decisions related to that input. Whether upstream stages are more or less
likely to be integrated than downstream stages turns out to depend critically on the relative size of
the parameters  and . When inputs are suﬃciently close complements ( ), the optimal
choice involves the outsourcing of upstream stages and the integration of downstream stages, while
the converse is true when inputs are suﬃciently close substitutes ( ).19
C. Partial Contractibility
The models above have assumed that none of the aspects of production, except the allocation of
ownership rights and a lump-sum transfer, are contractible before productive investments have
taken place. This is obviously an unrealistic assumption even in the international environments we
will be considering shortly, so it is important to discuss the implications of relaxing it. For that
purpose, and to simplify matters, let us go back to the case in which there is a unique supplier
with whom  contracts and revenue is given by the simpler function in (6). Following Acemoglu
et al. (2007) and Antr` as and Helpman (2008), we now allow the inputs  and  to be produced
by combining a set of input-speciﬁc components or services { ()}∈[01] for  = ,e a c ha ta
marginal cost , according to
 =e x p
∙Z 1
0
log ()
¸
 =  (14)
To capture partial contractibility, assume that the components related to input  in the range
£
0 
¤
,
0 ≤  ≤ 1,  = , are now contractible in the sense that the characteristics of these activities can
be fully speciﬁed in advance in an enforceable ex-ante contract (though these investments take place
19Intuitively, outsourcing elicits high levels of investment from upstream suppliers. The complementarity of up-
stream with downstream inputs in the case   in turn alleviates the underinvestment problem for downstream
suppliers, and the ﬁrm introduces fewer distortions by integrating downstream to retain a larger share of the realized
output and enhance the investments in headquarter services.
14at  = 2, simultaneously with the noncontractible ones). Notice that the parameters  and 
capture the level of contractibility of headquarter services and components, respectively. Because
the terms of exchange of some of the inputs are not determined by the initial contract,  and  will
again negotiate the price of those exchanges at  = 2. Even though each party is bound to provide
the contractually stipulated levels for the contractible components, they can threaten to withhold
part of the noncontractible ones, which in light of the speciﬁcation in (14) can signiﬁcantly impact
revenue. Following GH and in analogy with the benchmark model above, assume that suppliers
can entirely withhold those noncontractible components in case of a contractual breach when 
outsources the production of  to . Conversely, in the case of integration,  can selectively
ﬁre  in case of a contractual disagreement and use the components in production (since it has
ownership rights over them), but as in the benchmark model we continue to assume that this entails
an eﬃciency loss of a fraction 1 −  of revenue.
Given the symmetry in the model it is straightforward to verify that in equilibrium there will
be symmetric investments  in all noncontractible activities and  in all contractible activities
for  = . This allows writing the revenue function as
()=

 

 
(1−)
 
(1−)
 = ˜ 
(1−)
 
(1−)
 .
Clearly, this revenue function is identical to (6) except that the revenue shifter  is now replaced
by ˜  = ()
 ()
,w h i l e and  are now replaced by (1 − ) and (1 − ),
respectively. From the analysis above, it is then clear that the integration decision now depends on
the relative magnitude of the terms (1 − ) and (1 − ), that is, on the relative intensity
of the noncontractible inputs provided by  and , respectively. Furthermore, from equation (7),
the (hypothetical) share of revenue that would optimally be allocated to  is given by
∗
1 − ∗ =
s
(1 − )(1 − (1 − ))
(1 − )(1 − (1 − ))
, (15)
and is increasing in  and , and decreasing in  and .20 As Antr` as and Helpman (2008),
one can show the following sharper result:
Proposition 5 There exists a unique headquarter-intensity cutoﬀ ˆ  ∈ (01) such that proﬁts are
higher under outsourcing for   ˆ  and higher under integration for   ˆ .F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h e
cutoﬀ  is higher the larger  is and the smaller  is.
This result highlights that, with partial contractibility, the integration decision not only depends
on the level of headquarter intensity, but also on the degrees of contractibility of the diﬀerent inputs,
with distinct eﬀects for diﬀerent types of inputs. An improvement in contracting possibilities for
20It may seem surprising that we do not need to concern ourselves with solving for the level of contractible
investments and computing overall proﬁts in order to determine the optimal bargaining share in (15). Note, however,
that the level of contractible investments is irrelevant for the choice of 
∗ because these investments are set at  =0
to maximize joint surplus and thus the envelope theorem washes out these terms in the ﬁrst-order condition in (2).
15components enhances integration (since  is less dependent on the incentive eﬀects of outsourcing
to elicit investments from ), while an improvement on the contractibility of headquarter services
has the opposite eﬀect and makes integration less attractive.
D. Organizational Fixed Costs and Producer Heterogeneity
The frameworks we have considered so far treat the decisions of  and its suppliers independently
of the decisions of other ﬁrms in ’s industry. In reality, ﬁrms within industries tend to face
similar demand conditions and tend to operate with similar production technologies. Yet, even
within narrowly deﬁned industries, we observe signiﬁcant variation in the organizational decisions
of ﬁrms, including the location of their production stages but also the extent of control they want
to exert over those processes. What explains these diﬀerences? I next follow Antr` as and Helpman
(2004) in showing how the mere existence of either heterogeneity in the (Hicks-neutral) productivity
level or in the demand level faced by ﬁrms can give rise to heterogeneous organizational decisions
among ﬁrms sharing a common headquarter intensity level. A useful implication of generating
such heterogeneity is that the key parameters of the model not only aﬀect the incentives of ﬁrms to
integrate or not particular production processes (something that is rarely observed in the data), but
they now also lead to smooth changes in the set of ﬁrms choosing diﬀerent organizational modes,
thus generating comparative static predictions for how changes in these parameters aﬀect aggregate
measures of the prevalence of integration in particular sectors.
In order to illustrate these features, I consider two simple modiﬁcations of the above framework.
First, the revenue function now includes a productivity (or demand shifter) ,
()=, (16)
so that ﬁrms with higher values of  generate larger amounts of revenue for a given size of invest-
ments in  and , perhaps because they combine these inputs more eﬃciently or perhaps because
consumers are particularly keen on the manner in which these inputs are combined. Let  be dis-
tributed across ﬁrms according to the cumulative density function (). The second new feature is
the presence of organizational ﬁxed costs ,  = , that vary by ownership structure. Following
Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008), I focus on the plausible case in which integration entails higher
ﬁxed costs than outsourcing,   , though most of the results discussed in this survey only re-
quire that these organizational ﬁxed costs be distinct from each other.21 With these assumptions it
is straightforward to verify the following result (see Antr` as and Helpman, 2004, 2008, for a proof):
Proposition 6 There exists a unique headquarter-intensity cutoﬀ ˆ  ∈ (01) and a unique pro-
ductivity level ˆ , such that if   ˆ  all ﬁrms outsource the production of ,w h i l ei f  ˆ ,
all ﬁrms with ˆ outsource the production of , while all ﬁrms with ˆ  ﬁrm integrate it.
21There is an obvious tension between this assumption and the spirit of GH’s approach which associates diﬀerent
ownerships structures only with diﬀerent allocations of assets, while holding technology and contracting constant.
Still, diﬀerences in these organizational ﬁxed costs are likely to be relevant in practice so the literature has incorporated
them into the analysis.
16I nt h el a t t e rc a s e ,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms integrating the production of  is increasing in the level of
headquarter intensity and decreasing in the level of component intensity.
Intuitively, even though integration might be the organizational mode that maximizes operating
proﬁts whenever   ˆ , ﬁr m sw i t hr e l a t i v e l yl o wr e v e n u el e v e l sm i g h tn o tb ea b l et oa m o r t i z e
the relatively high ﬁxed costs associated with integration and are thus left to obtain input  via
outsourcing contracts.
3 The Boundaries of Multinational Firms
In this section, I overview how the property-rights theory has been used to draw multinational ﬁrm
boundaries and thereby shed light on important aspects of the international economy. I ﬁrst discuss
how the benchmark partial-equilibrium model developed above is modiﬁed by the possibility of
international trade across borders and later discuss how the framework can be embedded in industry
equilibrium and also in general equilibrium. The bulk of the section is devoted to describing the
novel results that emerge from such an analysis.
We begin by considering an -country version of the benchmark model in the previous section,
but now allow  to locate diﬀerent parts of the production process in diﬀerent countries. The
production process we described above entails three stages (production of , ,a n dt h eﬁnal
good), thus giving rise to several potential locational decisions. Let us denote by  the set of
possible locational decisions and by  ∈  a particular one. For example,  could entail production
of headquarter services and of the ﬁnal good in ’s Home country and production of  in a foreign
country. Notice that diﬀerent location choices will in general entail diﬀerent values for the key
parameters of the model. In particular, trade barriers (technological or man-made), and cross-
country diﬀerences in production costs and in institutions imply that diﬀerent locational choices
can be associated with diﬀerent values for the parameters , ,  ,  and  ,a sw e l la sf o rt h e
revenue function (). How do these generalizations aﬀect the way ﬁrms organize production?
In analogy with (P1), the optimal ownership structure ∗ and the optimal locational choice ∗ now
solve the following program:
max
∈{}∈

 = 
³

 

´
− 
 · 
 − 
 · 
 − 

 
 =a r gm a x 
n


³


´
− 
 · 
o
(P2)

 =a r gm a x 
n³
1 − 

´

³


´
− 
 · 
o
Notice that even in this stylized model the cardinality of the ﬁrms’ choice set can be very
large. There are 3 potential production stages, 2 possible ownership structures and  countries,
thus giving rise to at least 23 possible organizational modes.22 For  = 5, this generates 250
22This assumes that headquarter services and ﬁnal-good production are always integrated (which is consistent with
the property-rights theory since  is essential for those stages), and that the production of  takes place in only one
country. Relaxing these assumptions would only increase the complexity of the ﬁrm problem.
17possible combinations, while for  = 100, there are two million combinations. To reduce the
dimensionality of the problem, the literature has typically followed one of two approaches. One
of them involves imposing symmetry across countries in most parameters of the model, while the
other one entails focusing on two-country environments. Below, I will sketch an example of each of
these two approaches.
3.1 Headquarter Intensity and Comparative Advantage
Antr` as (2003) considers a general-equilibrium model of trade in which consumers in  countries
have identical preferences and spend a constant share of their income on a continuum of diﬀer-
entiated varieties in two sectors  and . The setup is similar to the transaction-cost model in
Grossman and Helpman (2002). Identical Dixit-Stiglitz subutility functions in each sector give rise
to a demand function for a particular variety  in sector  of the form
 ()=
 R 
0 ()−(1−)
 ()
−1(1−) =  ()
−1(1−) , (17)
where  is the share of aggregate spending  spent in sector ,  is the measure of varieties
available to consumers, and  governs how substitutable varieties are within sectors. Because ﬁrms
take their demand shifter as given, ﬁrm revenue can simply be expressed as  ()=1−
  ()

(see eq. (17)), where  is treated as a constant by ﬁrms. Production of diﬀerentiated varieties is
as described in section 2, with ﬁnal-good production of each variety being controlled by a diﬀerent
manager  who is also in charge of providing headquarter services but needs to contract with a
production plant manager  for the provision of input . Production of inputs can be located
in any of the  countries in the world. Antr` as (2003) focuses on the case in which  and 
produce output according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, with
the elasticity of output to headquarter services given by a sector-speciﬁc constant, which I denote
by . The production technology is identical for all ﬁrms within an industry. Notice that ﬁrm-level
revenue takes the isoelastic form in (6).
To simplify the complexities inherent in the general problem (P2), Antr` as (2003) considers the
case in which countries diﬀer only in their relative factor endowments and thus in their (autarky)
factor costs. In particular, he rules out trade costs across countries, lets contract incompleteness
and the eﬃciency loss parameter  be identical in all countries, and also assumes that organizational
ﬁxed costs are independent of ownership structure and feature the same factor intensity as variable
costs (i.e., they combine and  under the same Cobb-Douglas aggregator as these enter the ﬁrm’s
production function).
The combination of these assumptions makes the problem (P2) particularly easy to solve be-
cause the ownership structure and location decisions can be treated independent from each other.
In particular, the ownership structure decision is characterized by Proposition 2 above with  man-
agers worldwide choosing to integrate their suppliers if   ˆ  and outsource to them if   ˆ ,t h e
key being that ˆ  is independent of production costs (and thus factor prices). On the other hand,
18the location decision boils down to choosing the location of input production that minimizes the
marginal cost of provision of inputs. Antr` as (2003) assumes that when  invests in  for a produc-
tion plant located in country , it needs to hire local factors  and thus faces the production costs
in that country, thus implying that the location decision simply solves min
n¡


¢ ¡


¢1−
o
.23
In order to complete the description of the general-equilibrium of the world economy, one needs
to specify the market structure in each industry as well as the factors of production that ﬁrms
employ in producing inputs. Antr` as (2003) considers a Helpman-Krugman (1985) model with
monopolistic competition and free entry driving proﬁts down to zero.24 He assumes that inputs
are produced with physical capital and labor and that the production of headquarter services is
more capital intensive than that of components. The latter is the key assumption of the paper as
it introduces a positive correlation between the abstract concept of headquarter intensity and an
observable variable, namely capital intensity. Antr` as (2003) justiﬁes this assumption on empirical
grounds, arguing that cost-sharing practices of multinational ﬁrms in their relations with indepen-
dent subcontractors tend to be associated with physical capital investments rather than with labor
input choices. We shall come back to the plausibility of this assumption in section 4.
Given the positive association between headquarter intensity and capital intensity, Proposition
2 then implies a higher prevalence of integration in capital-intensive sectors. To complete the
characterization of the equilibrium, one need only impose that factor markets clear country by
country and that world income equals world spending. Antr` as (2003) shows that if relative factor
endowments are not too diﬀerent across countries, free trade will equalize factor prices worldwide,
but aggregate production patterns and bilateral trade ﬂows across countries will be fully determined.
For example, labor-abundant countries will end up with the same wage level as capital-abundant
countries, but factor-market clearing ensures that they will end up producing a disproportionate
amount of the worldwide production inputs in the labor-intensive industry.
Antr` as (2003) derives explicit formulas for overall bilateral trade ﬂo w sa sw e l la st h e i ri n t r a ﬁrm
component and highlights two main predictions from the model. First, in a cross-section of indus-
tries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports should be increasing in the capital intensity
in production of the exporting industry.25 Second, in a cross-section of countries, the share of
intraﬁrm imports in total imports should be increasing in the aggregate capital-labor ratio of the
exporting country, as labor-abundant countries tend to export small amounts of capital-intensive
goods.
23The fact that technology involves increasing returns to scale ensures that, with free trade, each input will be
produced in only one location.
24In order to ensure that no agent earns rents in equilibrium, Antr` as (2003) allows  managers to make take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers to  managers at  = 0. The ex-ante transfer between  and  thus ensures that  managers end
up with a zero net payoﬀ. On the other hand, free entry by  managers implies that the expected operating proﬁts
from producing a diﬀerentiated variety in a given industry exactly cover the ﬁxed organizational costs associated with
that industry. An alternative approach is developed in Grossman and Helpman (2002), where a process of search is
speciﬁed and free entry leads all agents to anticipate a zero net payoﬀ in expectation despite the absence of ex-ante
transfers between agents.
25Strictly speaking, the model predicts that this share should be 0 for all industries with capital intensity below ˆ 
and 1 for all industries with capital intensity above this threshold.
193.2 Heterogeneity and Global Sourcing
In the model in Antr` as (2003), the organizational decisions of ﬁrms in the world economy and
their implications for certain aggregate variables, such as the intraﬁrm component of trade across
industries and countries, are easy to characterize due to the strong symmetry assumptions made
regarding the nature of contracting across countries. These “tractability” assumptions are the
bread and butter of applied theorists seeking to construct models to understand certain qualitative
features of the world. Yet these same assumptions often result in models that are not particularly
useful tools for empirical analysis. As an example, Antr` as’ (2003) model clariﬁes that a variable
that is well-known to be key in understanding the pattern of trade, namely capital intensity, may
also be a key determinant of the integration decision of multinational ﬁrms and of the intraﬁrm
component of trade, but it does so by making assumptions that render the model unsuitable for
empirical analyses of the global sourcing strategies of ﬁrms or for empirical studies of the various
determinants of the share of intraﬁrm trade.
In this section, I brieﬂy describe the frameworks in Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008), which
incorporate several sources of heterogeneity while keeping the analysis manageable by focusing
on a particularly simple two-country, North-South model. The key elements of the model are
as follows. Consumers in both countries demand the output of one homogenous-good sector and
 diﬀerentiated-good sectors. Preferences are quasilinear in the homogenous good and feature a
constant elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated varieties within a sector and also between
varieties in diﬀerent sectors (with the latter elasticity assumed higher). This preference structure
delivers a demand function for a particular variety in industry  that is analogous to that in (17),
but with a demand shifter that is only a function of the aggregate consumption in the sector.
Firm behavior is a variant of the general program (P2). It is assumed that all  managers reside
in the North and that the ﬁnal good and headquarter services are always produced in that country.
The location decision thus reduces to the choice of where to produce , i.e.,  ∈ {}. Producers
in each country face a perfectly elastic supply of a unique factor of production, labor. Wage rates
are ﬁxed in general equilibrium by the ‘outside’ homogenous good sector and technology in that
sector is such that   .T h eﬁnal good is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
in  and  that features a productivity shifter . Given these assumptions, the revenue function
is of the type introduced above in (16). The productivity parameter  is ﬁrm speciﬁc and drawn
from a Pareto distribution with shape , i.e., ()=1− ()
 for  ≥ 0, while the elasticity
of output with respect to , denoted again by ,i sc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms within a sector, but may
vary across sectors. Production of intermediate inputs requires one unit of labor per unit of output
in the country where they are produced. International trade in components is costly and  units
of  need to be shipped from the South for one unit to arrive to the North. Provided that this
transport cost is low enough, these assumptions imply that 
 = 
 =    = 
.
Production also involves diﬀerent types of ﬁxed costs, which are all deﬁned in terms of Northern
labor. First,  needs to incur a ﬁxed cost  of entry, upon which the productivity parameter 
is revealed to him or her, as in Melitz (2003). If  decides to remain in the market, additional
20ﬁxed organizational costs need to be incurred. As discussed above and in more detail in Antr` as
and Helpman (2004), these ﬁxed organizational costs are likely to vary depending on whether  is
sourced in the North or in the South, and on whether it is insourced or outsourced. In particular,
a natural ranking of these ﬁxed costs is

  
  
  
 .
In words, ﬁxed organizational costs are higher when  is located in the South regardless of own-
ership structure, and given the location of ,t h eﬁxed organizational costs are higher when  is
integrated than when it is not.
In terms of the contracting parameters, Antr` as and Helpman (2004) consider environments in
which no aspects of  and  are contractible regardless of where production takes place but there
is cross-country variation in the eﬃciency loss parameter ,w i t h  , and thus 
  
 ,
reﬂecting better legal protection in the North. Antr` as and Helpman (2008) extend the analysis to
incorporate partial contractibility (along the lines of the model developed in section 2.3.C above),
and allow the degree of contractibility to be a function of both the type of input and the country
where production takes place.
Given the assumptions of the model, the choice of an organizational form faces two types of
tensions. In terms of the location decision, the South entails relatively lower variable costs, but
relatively higher ﬁxed costs. As in the work of Melitz (2003), it is clear that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity parameter  will crucially aﬀect the ﬁrm’s participation in foreign sourcing. In terms
of the ownership structure decision, integration improves eﬃciency of variable production when the
intensity of headquarter services is high (as implied by Proposition 2), but involves higher ﬁxed
costs. Hence, the integration decision will crucially depend on both  and .
Antr` as and Helpman (2004) show that the model can easily generate equilibria featuring multiple
organizational forms within an industry. In particular, in suﬃciently headquarter-intensive sectors
it is possible for the least productive ﬁrms to exit the market upon observing their productivity,
and for four nonempty (and connected) subsets of the remaining ﬁrms to choose each of the four
possible organizational forms. The most productive ﬁrms in the North engage in foreign insourcing
(or FDI in the South), the next most productive ﬁrms undertake foreign outsourcing, the next
subset insource domestically, and the least productive ﬁrms among the surviving ones outsource
domestically. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1.
Antr` as and Helpman (2004) also use the model to study the various determinants of the relative
prevalence of these diﬀerent organizational forms. As hinted above, the predictions of their model
move well beyond those derived in Antr` as (2003) and have served as the springboard for empirical
studies of the determinants of the global sourcing strategies of ﬁrms. In particular, the model
predicts that, in a cross-section of industries, the share of intraﬁrm imports of components in total
imports of components should be higher in industries with higher headquarter intensity (higher ),
higher productivity dispersion (lower ), and higher transport costs or import tariﬀs( h i g h e r).
Furthermore, these parameters shape the relative prevalence of domestic insourcing and domestic
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Figure 1: Sorting in a Headquarter Intensive Sector (Antr` as and Helpman 2004, 2008)
outsourcing in the same manner (even for the case of trade frictions ).
When extending the model to allow for partial contractibility, Antr` as and Helpman (2008)
ﬁnd that an improvement in contractual institutions in South raises the share of ﬁrms engaged
in oﬀshoring in that country, but it can reduce the relative prevalence of either FDI or oﬀshore
outsourcing if it aﬀects disproportionately the contractibility of headquarter services or components,
respectively. This result relates to our previous Proposition 5, which highlighted that the relative
prevalence of alternative organizational forms crucially depends on the degree to which contractual
incompleteness aﬀects the inputs controlled by the ﬁnal-good producer or by his or her suppliers.
3.3 Brief Overview of Other Contributions
Before discussing the empirical implementation of the property-rights theory of multinational ﬁrm
boundaries, I brieﬂyo v e r v i e wo t h e rs i g n i ﬁcant contributions to the literature and I later identify
what I view as important gaps in the literature.
In section 2.3.A, I discussed the eﬀects of ﬁnancial or liquidity constraints on the integration
decision. Naturally, the results derived there have implications for how ﬁrm boundaries are pinned
down in open-economy environments. For instance, Basco (2010) and Carluccio and Fally (forth-
coming) develop general-equilibrium, open-economy models in which, consistently with Proposition
3, multinationals are more likely to integrate suppliers located in countries with poor ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. Furthermore, both papers predict that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development should be
especially large when trade involves complex goods, and both provide independent empirical evi-
dence supporting this prediction.
As emphasized by Legros and Newman (2008), in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints, equi-
librium ﬁrm boundaries will also depend on the relative ex-ante bargaining power of each party
and their ability to exchange lump-sum transfers. This idea has been fruitfully applied in open-
economy environments by Conconi et al. (forthcoming) and Alfaro et al. (2010) who show that
vertical integration should be relatively more prevalent in industries in which (relative) prices are
high, perhaps due to import-protecting trade policies. Intuitively, in their setup, which builds on
Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2010) and Legros and Newman (2009), ownership decisions are not ex-ante
optimal, but instead trade oﬀ the pecuniary beneﬁts of coordinating production achieved under
22integration and the managers’ private beneﬁts of operating in their preferred ways associated with
non-integration. Consequently, the higher the industry price, the higher are the monetary beneﬁts
of integration and thus the more attractive this option is. Alfaro et al. (2010) provide evidence of
a positive association between import tariﬀs and domestic integration decisions. D´ ıez (2010) ﬁnds
similar evidence in a cross-section of U.S. industries when looking at intraﬁrm trade ﬂows, but
interprets the result in light of the Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) models, which as mentioned
above, also predicts a positive eﬀect of imports tariﬀs on foreign integration. I will illustrate his
empirical results in section 4.
The insights of the property-rights theory have also been applied to dynamic, general-equilibrium
models of international trade with the goal of understanding how ownership decisions vary along
the life-cycle of a product or input. Antr` as (2005), for instance, develops a model in which the
incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions limits the extent to which the
production process can be fragmented across borders, thereby generating the emergence of Vernon-
type product cycles, with new goods being initially manufactured in North (where product devel-
opment takes place), and only later (when the goods are mature) is manufacturing carried out in
South. Antr` as (2005) also draws the boundaries of multinational ﬁrms and shows that the model
gives rise to a new version of the product cycle in which, consistently with empirical evidence,
manufacturing is shifted to the South ﬁrst within ﬁrm boundaries, and only at a later stage to
independent ﬁrms in the South.26
Throughout this section, I have restricted myself to reviewing papers that can be considered
‘direct oﬀspring’ of GH in the sense that they adopt variants of the property-rights approach to
drawing ﬁrm boundaries in open-economy environments. As I will spell out in more detail in
the Conclusion, the incomplete-contracting framework of GH has had a much broader impact in
the international trade ﬁeld via the inﬂuence of other theoretical frameworks that are themselves
‘direct oﬀspring’ of GH. For instance, in the presence of incomplete contracts, another important
organizational decision of ﬁrms concerns the allocation of decision rights among employees. In
particular, in the presence of noncontractible eﬀort decisions by workers, managers face a trade-oﬀ
between granting decision rights to workers or keeping these to themselves. The former option has
the beneﬁt of providing workers with ‘initiative,’ which may lead to higher eﬀort, but delegation
may result in decisions that are not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the manager.
Avoiding delegation (i.e., exerting ‘authority’) tends to inhibit the initiative of workers but entails
more control over the course of production. This trade-oﬀ was ﬁrst formalized by Aghion and Tirole
(1997) and has been applied to general-equilibrium frameworks by Marin and Verdier (2009) and
Puga and Treﬂer (2010).
26Despite the dynamic nature of the model, Antr` as (2005) assumes that the game played by managers can be
treated as a static one and thus abstracts from an analysis of reputational equilibria. Corcos (2006) studies such
dynamic contracts by applying the relational contract approach of Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002).
233.4 The Road Ahead
In the year 2036, we will be celebrating the 50th anniversary of Grossman and Hart’s article. How
will GH shape the ﬁeld of international trade in the next 25 years? As I will try to convey in the
next section, there are good reasons to believe that the bulk of new work on multinational ﬁrm
boundaries will be empirical in nature. I believe, however, that the theoretical frameworks that
have been developed to date are still too rudimentary to be taken to the data in their current form.
To a large extent this is due to the fact that these models were designed to guide empirical work
based on industry-level data, while future work is more likely to make use of ﬁrm-level datasets.
The theoretical frameworks in Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) generate a rich set of predictions,
but they are fairly low-dimensional (featuring one supplier per ﬁrm and only two countries) and
impose substantial symmetry in order to highlight a few key industry-level predictions. For example,
the assumption that headquarter intensity varies across industries but not across ﬁrms within an
industry is clearly counterfactual (see Corcos et al., forthcoming, for French evidence). Future
models should also incorporate multiple inputs and suppliers as in the model developed in section
2.3.B, while allowing for some heterogeneity among these inputs.27 Introducing such new sources
of heterogeneity into the sort of partial equilibrium models that we started with in section 2.1 is
relatively straightforward. The challenge for future theoretical work is to introduce these features
in a way that still permits characterizing the open-economy general equilibrium of such models,
a feature that might be particularly relevant for performing counterfactual exercises when one is
estimating these models structurally.
Another potentially fruitful area for future research relates to the study of the eﬀects of the
non-excludable nature of knowledge on the internalization decision. Following GH, existing work
has arguably focused too much on the distortionary eﬀect of contractual incompleteness on ex-ante
investments. In practice ex-post ineﬃciencies, including the possibility of technological expropri-
ation by suppliers or licensees are often highlighted as being key to the internalization decisions
of multinational ﬁrms. Previous attempts to incorporate a notion of non-excludable knowledge
into general equilibrium models of the multinational ﬁrm have adopted a transaction-cost approach
and thus shed little light on how foreign integration circumvents the dissipation of knowledge to
local producers. A more satisfactory approach would entail the application of the property-rights
approach and of the notion of ‘access’ developed by Rajan and Zingales (2001).28
4 Taking the Property-Rights Theory to International Data
As I argued in the Introduction, the growing importance of international production networks,
involving transactions both within and across multinational ﬁrms, is a key factor in understanding
the recent impact of the property-rights theory in the ﬁeld of international trade. Although the
27The recent papers by Antr` as and Chor (2011), van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2011) and Schwarz and Suedekum
(2011) constitute ﬁrst steps in that direction.
28See Chen, Horstmann and Markusen (2008) and Ponzetto (2009) for early attempts along these lines.
24trigger for the development of new theoretical models was empirical in nature, it is fair to say that
this branch of the literature has yet not come full circle in providing deﬁnitive empirical tests of
these models. Several well-crafted papers have oﬀered diﬀerent pieces of evidence that are consistent
with the property-rights theory, but the power of such tests remains fairly low.
In great part, these limitations are due to the fact that empirically validating the property-rights
theory poses at least two important challenges. First, data on the integration decisions of ﬁrms
are not readily available, and thus researchers are often left to test these theories with industry- or
product-level data, which do not always allow one to appropriately control for unobservable char-
acteristics of ﬁrms that might be driving the patterns observed in the data. Second, the predictions
from the property-rights theory are associated with subtle features of the environment (such as the
relative value of the marginal return to non-contractible, relationship-speciﬁc investments) that, by
their own nature, are generally unobservable in the data (see Whinston, 2003).
Admittedly, the contributions in the international trade literature have not made too much
progress regarding this second hurdle, though the issue has not been completely ignored, as I will
highlight later in this section. With regard to the ﬁrst challenge on data availability, however,
an advantage of researchers in our ﬁeld is that data on international transactions are particularly
accessible due to the widespread existence of oﬃcial records of goods and services crossing borders.
For instance, there exist fairly detailed data on U.S. intraﬁrm trade at the six-digit Harmonized
System classiﬁcation of the product shipped (of which there are over 5,000 categories) and at the
origin/destination country level. This amounts to hundreds of thousands of observations per year
on the relative prevalence of integration versus nonintegration. In the next section, I will discuss
some of the pros and cons to using these data to test the property-rights theory and will also
graphically illustrate some of the empirical patterns that emerge from the data and how they relate
to the models we discussed above.
Beyond these product-level datasets from oﬃcial statistics, a few researchers have made use
of ﬁrm-level datasets (with diﬀerent levels of representativeness) that contain detailed information
on the sourcing strategies of ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries. In the second part of this section, I will
provide more details on these datasets and on how they have been used to test the property-rights
theory of the multinational ﬁrm. I will conclude this section by oﬀering some thoughts on future
avenues for empirical research in the area.
4.1 Tests with Product-Level Intraﬁrm Trade Data
As i g n i ﬁcant share of empirical tests of the property-rights theory of the multinational ﬁrm have
used data from oﬃcial import and export merchandise trade statistics, which in some countries
identify whether transactions involve related or non-related parties. Most tests use the “U.S.
Related Party Trade” data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, so I
will focus on discussing some of the advantages and disadvantages that are associated with using
this data source. Later, I will brieﬂy discuss some special features of a similar dataset compiled by
the Customs General Administration of the People’s Republic of China, which has also been used
25in the literature.
A. Pros and Cons of Product-Level Sources
Several features of these oﬃcial statistics make them particularly attractive to empirical researchers.
First, for some countries, notably the United States, intraﬁrm trade data are publicly available and
easily downloadable from government websites.29 Second, the data are of high quality and are not
subject to sampling error, since several quality assurance procedures are performed, and the data
oﬀer a complete picture of the sourcing strategies of ﬁrms in a country. Third, there is a large
amount of variation in the data: the share of U.S. intraﬁrm imports over total U.S. imports varies
widely across products and origin countries, and there also exists signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni nt h a ts h a r e
across products within exporting countries and across exporting countries within narrowly-deﬁned
products. This is an important feature of the data so I will document it below. Fourth, by including
information on all industrial sectors, these data make it easier to spot certain fundamental factors
that appear to shape whether international transactions are internalized or not independently
of the sector one studies. A ﬁfth advantage of using these comprehensive datasets is that by
covering a wide range of sectors, countries and time periods, they oﬀer the potential to exploit
exogenous changes in sector characteristics (due perhaps to technological change) or in institutional
characteristics of exporting or importing countries (due, for instance, to institutional reforms) to
better identify some of eﬀects predicted by the property-rights theory.
It is important, however, to also be up-front about some of the limitations of using this type of
data. First, there is an obvious tension in using product-level data, which aggregate the decisions
of various ﬁrms, to test the validity of theories of ﬁrm boundaries. Although some of the available
data are suﬃciently disaggregated to ensure that each observation aggregates the transactions of
only a handful of ﬁrms (or perhaps even just one ﬁrm), the inability to control for idiosyncratic
ﬁrm-level characteristics remains problematic. Second, the data are reported based on the sector or
industry category of the good being transacted and do not contain information on the sector that
is purchasing the good or on whether the good is an intermediate inputs or a ﬁnal good (though
the level of disaggregation of the data often allows to make informed choices about whether or
not the goods are inputs). Third, in related party transactions, the data do not typically report
which ﬁrm is owned by whom, i.e., whether integration is backward or forward, and also do not
provide information on the extent of control (or ownership share) of the parent company.30 A
29The U.S. data are publicly available at: http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty/. This website per-
mits downloading the data at the six-digit NAICS level. The ﬁner six-digit Harmonized System (HS) data
are available from the U.S. Census for a fee. Other researchers (e.g., Zeile, 1997, Antr` as, 2003) have con-
structed intraﬁrm trade using direct investment data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or BEA (see
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index MNC.cfm), but the publicly available data do not feature a ﬁne industry disag-
gregation. The underlying ﬁrm-level data used to construct this dataset are available only to researchers aﬃlated
with the BEA and have not been used to test the property-rights theory.
30The U.S. data deﬁne related-party trade as including import transactions between parties with various types of
relationships including “any person directly or indirectly, owning, controll i n go rh o l d i n gp o w e rt ov o t e ,6p e r c e n t
of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any organization.” In practice, extracts from the conﬁdential direct
i n v e s t m e n td a t a s e tc o l l e c t e db yt h eB E As u g g e s tt h a ti n t r a ﬁrm trade is generally associated with one of the entities
26fourth and ﬁnal concern in using these data to study the global sourcing strategies of ﬁrms based
in a given country (say the U.S.) is that this country’s trade statistics will only capture those
sourcing decisions that entail goods being shipped back to that country, while in practice some
large ﬁrms have production networks in which parts and components are shipped across foreign
locations (within and across ﬁrm boundaries) and then only shipped back to the home country
after being assembled abroad (as is the case of the iPad 2 discussed in the Introduction). For this
reason, U.S. intraﬁrm imports generally underrepresent the involvement of U.S. multinational ﬁrms
in global sourcing strategies, though it is not obvious how this phenomenon biases the results of
empirical studies using these data.
B. Some Features of U.S. Intraﬁrm Trade Data
Before I discuss in detail how U.S. intraﬁrm trade data have been employed to test the property-
rights theory, it is worth providing some brief descriptive statistics that demonstrate the empirical
relevance of intraﬁrm trade and illustrate how the share of intraﬁrm trade varies across products
and countries. Throughout the section, I focus on data on U.S. imports of goods for the year 2010,
except when using the more disaggregated six-digit Harmonized System data, for which the most
recent year available (to me) is 2005.
In 2010, intraﬁrm imports of goods totaled $922 billion and constituted a remarkable 486p e r -
cent of total U.S. imports of goods ($1899 billion), thus indicating the importance of multinational
ﬁrms for U.S. trade. The share of U.S. intraﬁrm imports varies widely across countries. On the one
end, intraﬁrm imports equal 0 for 13 countries and territories (including Cuba and North Korea),
which all record very low volumes of exports to the U.S., while the share of intraﬁrm trade reaches
a record level of 989 percent for U.S. imports from Mauritius. Leaving aside communist dictator-
ships and tropical islands and focusing on the 50 largest exporters to the U.S., Figure 2 illustrates
that the share of intraﬁrm trade still varies signiﬁcantly across countries, ranging from a mere 27
percent for Bangladesh to 836 percent for Costa Rica.
Similarly, the share of intraﬁrm trade varies widely depending on the type of product being
imported. Again, the raw data contain infrequently traded goods with shares close to 0 and 100,
but even when focusing on the top 25 six-digit NAICS industries by importing volume, one observes
in Figure 3 signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni nt h es h a r eo fi n t r a ﬁrm trade, ranging from shares under 8 percent
for U.S. imports of women’s and girls’ blouses, shirts and other outerwear to over 95 percent for
imports of ﬁnished autos and light duty vehicles as well as of ﬁnished heavy duty trucks.
The very high intraﬁrm trade share of these ﬁnished vehicle industries (which are associated
with exports from foreign manufacturing plants to U.S. wholesale aﬃliates) highlights one of the
potential limitations of the data mentioned above, namely the fact that it combines data on both
having a controlling stake in the other entity. Furthermore, the same source indicates that about two-thirds of total
U.S. intraﬁrm imports are accounted for by imports shipped by overseas aﬃliates to their U.S. parents, rather than
by imports shipped to U.S. aﬄiates by their foreign parent group. Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) use information from
this same dataset to restrict the sample to countries for which at least two-thirds of intra-ﬁrm U.S. imports from the
country are imported by U.S. parents.
27Figure 2: Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports for Largest 50 U.S. Exporters in 2010
intermediate input sectors and ﬁnal good sectors. It is important to emphasize, however, that
the question of why ﬁnished vehicles are rarely imported at arm’s-length is one of tracing ﬁrm
boundaries (though applying in manufacturer-distributor relationships rather than in supplier-
manufacturer relationships), and thus it is not obvious that one would want to discard these type
of observations when testing the property-rights theory of multinational ﬁrms. In any case, the
deeper the level of disaggregation in the data, the easier it is to distinguish the nature of the
products being imported.
I next illustrate this point by moving from the publicly available six-digit NAICS classiﬁcation
(with around 450 distinct industry categories) to the six-digit Harmonized System classiﬁcation
(which contains over 5,000 distinct products).31 Continuing to focus on the case of vehicle imports,
in Figure 4 I report the share of intraﬁrm trade for the 76 six-digit subcategories of the two-digit
HS industry 87 (‘Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories
thereof’). Again, the variation in the share of intraﬁrm trade within the sector is obvious to the
eye and again essentially ranges from 0 to 100 percent.32
In Figure 5, I restrict the sample to a subset of these 76 subcategories, namely those that
fall under the four-digit sector 8708 (‘Parts and accessories of motor vehicles’) thereby focusing on
intermediate input imports. Though the share of intraﬁrm trade now only ranges from 34.4 percent
for ‘road wheels and parts’ to 78.7 percent for ‘gear boxes for motor vehicles’, it is clear that ﬁrms
31I thank Nathan Nunn and Dan Treﬂer for allowing me to use their data to illustrate the rich variation in the
data. The empirical results in the rest of the paper use the publicly available six-digit NAICS data.
32A verbal description of these industry codes is available from the following website: http://www.foreign-
trade.com/reference/hscode.htm
28Figure 3: Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports for Top 25 Importing Industries (NAICS6) in 2010
Figure 4: Variation in the Share of Intraﬁrm Trade within HS 87 (Vehicles, exc. Railways, and
Parts) in 2005
29based in the U.S. seem to source diﬀerent auto parts under quite diﬀerent ownership structures.
As a ﬁnal illustration of the richness and variation in the data, in Figure 6 I take one of the
six-digit HS industries depicted in Figure 5, namely HS 870810 (‘Bumpers and parts thereof for
motor vehicles’), and report the share of intraﬁrm trade for all 42 countries with positive exports
to the U.S. in that sector. As is clear from the graph, even when focusing on a narrowly-deﬁned
component, a similar pattern to that in Figure 2 emerges, with U.S.-based ﬁrms appearing to source
particular inputs quite diﬀerently depending on the location from which these products are bought.
Imports from 12 of the 42 countries are exclusively transacted at arm’s-length, while two countries
(Slovakia and Hungary) sell bumpers to the U.S. exclusively within multinational ﬁrm boundaries.
The remaining 28 countries feature shares of intraﬁrm trade fairly uniformly distributed between
0 and 100 percent.
C. Intraﬁrm Trade and the Property-Rights Theory: Empirical Strategies and Findings
Having described some of the basic sources of variation in intraﬁrm data, I next turn to describing
how researchers have attempted to use the data to assess the empirical validity of the property-
rights theory of the ﬁrm. The key robust implication I have highlighted in sections 2 and 3 is that
the relative prevalence of integration should be higher in relationships that feature high headquarter
intensity, i.e., when noncontractible, relationship-speciﬁc investments carried out by headquarters
are disproportionately more important than those undertaken by suppliers. A key question is then:
how do we measure headquarter intensity in the data?
A ﬁrst attempt at dealing with this issue was oﬀered by Antr` as (2003). As mentioned above,
his property-rights theory of the multinational ﬁrm assumed that the investments provided by
headquarters are more physical capital intensive than those provided by suppliers. In his framework,
all investments are noncontractible and fully relationship-speciﬁc and thus the model generates a
positive correlation between the unobservable headquarter intensity and physical capital intensity.
The assumptions needed to make that connection are strong, so I will work on relaxing them below.
Even when making these assumptions, however, one is still faced with some open questions. First,
which capital intensity matters for the integration decision? And second, how does one measure it
in the data?
As pointed out above, intraﬁrm trade data do not identify the industry or sector purchasing
the imported goods, and thus one cannot easily construct a measure of capital intensity based
on the relative investments of the importing sector and those of the exporting sector. Following
Antr` as (2003), most researchers using intraﬁrm trade data have associated headquarter intensity
with the capital intensity of the product being imported.T h i si sb e c a u s ei nA n t r ` as’ (2003) general-
equilibrium model, factors of production are internationally immobile so the headquarter’s capital
investments are undertaken in the location of the supplier division or ﬁrm, thus implying that these
investments will be embodied in the intermediate input being shipped back to the headquarter’s
home country. With that strict interpretation, using the imported good sector’s capital intensity is
justiﬁed, yet it is important to bear in mind that, in the real world, headquarters often undertake
30Figure 5: Variation in the Share of Intraﬁrm Trade within HS Sector 8708 (Auto Parts) in 2005
Figure 6: Variation in the Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports within HS 870810 (Bumpers) in 2005
31other noncontractible relationship-speciﬁc investments that may not be embodied in the good being
imported. I will return to this point below.
Now even when settling on the use of the capital intensity of the product being imported as
a proxy of headquarter intensity, one still needs to measure it in the data. Ideally, one would
construct measures of capital intensity (such as the ratio of physical capital expenditures to labor
input expenditures) at the same level of disaggregation at which intraﬁrm trade data are avail-
able, namely at the product- and country-of-origin-level. Unfortunately, this is typically infeasible
because industry-level data on capital intensity at an acceptable level of disaggregation are only
available for a handful of countries. It should be emphasized that this limitation is not speciﬁct o
the use of intraﬁrm trade data and also applies to certain empirical tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model of trade (see, for instance, Romalis, 2004). A standard solution to this problem is to work
with data from just one country, typically the U.S. for reasons of availability and data quality, and
to impose the same capital intensity to all countries exporting a particular good. This assumption
is typically justiﬁed by appealing to the absence of capital intensity reversals.
In sum, a typical proxy for the headquarter intensity associated with U.S. imports in a given
good or sector is the physical capital intensity (i.e., the ratio of physical capital to employment) in
that good or sector in the U.S. It may be argued that Antr` as’ (2003) assumption that headquarters
and suppliers’ investments diﬀer only in their capital intensity is too restrictive. With that in mind,
the literature has oﬀered alternative measures of headquarter intensity based on other measures of
factor intensity, such as skill intensity (the ratio of nonproduction workers to production workers)
or R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales). The idea behind these proxies is that
headquarters are particularly likely to be involved in investments related to skilled workers (e.g.,
training) or to R&D outlays.
Having described the measurement of headquarter intensity, I next turn to discuss some of the
key ﬁndings in the literature. Rather than simply enumerating the results in previous papers, I
will attempt to illustrate some of the key ones with scatter plots.
Antr` as (2003) begins his paper by showing that in a cross-section of manufacturing sectors,
there exists a striking positive correlation between the share of intraﬁrm trade in that sector and
its physical capital intensity in the U.S. (see Figure 7). The data in Antr` as (2003) include, however,
only 23 fairly aggregated industries, and thus one might be skeptical of the robustness of such
correlation.33 This concern is addressed in Figure 8, in which I correlate the share of intraﬁrm
trade with the three measures of headquarter intensity mentioned above (capital intensity, R&D
intensity and skill intensity), while using the much more disaggregated U.S. Customs data on
intraﬁrm trade described above (which have only become available in recent years). The intraﬁrm
33Antr` as’ (2003) data are course because he used public extracts from the direct investment dataset collected by the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Yeaple (2006) performs similar tests using the conﬁdential BEA dataset,
which increases the number of sectors from 23 to 51 and also allows him to perform the analysis for diﬀerent sets
of countries. He ﬁnds that the eﬀect of capital intensity is robust to the ﬁner disaggregation of the data though it
appears much stronger when focusing on less developed and emerging economies than when restricting the sample to
d e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e s .H i se m p i r i c a la n a l y s i sa sw e l la sA n t r ` as’ have now been superseeded by a new wave of empirical
work using the much more disaggregated U.S. customs intraﬁrm trade data.
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Figure 7: The Share of Intraﬁrm Trade and Capital Intensity by Sector in Antr` as (2003)
trade shares are computed for imports from all exporting countries in a given six-digit NAICS, while
the headquarter intensity measures are computed using data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures
(in the case of capital and skill intensity) and from Orbis (in the case of R&D intensity).34 All
variables are averaged over the period 2000-05. As is clear from the left panel of Figure 8, the
positive correlation between the share of intraﬁrm trade and capital intensity is robust to the use
of this much more detailed dataset. The ﬁt is not as good as in the case of Antr` as (2003) but the
relationship is highly statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, as documented by Nunn and Treﬂer
(2011) and Bernard et al. (2010), this relationship is robust to the inclusion of various industry
controls and to the addition of country ﬁxed eﬀects in regressions that exploit both the industry
as well as the exporting country variation in the data.
The remaining two panels of Figure 8 show the correlations between the share of intraﬁrm
trade and R&D and skill intensity. The positive correlation between these variables is also strongly
statistically signiﬁcant and visible to the naked eye, and as in the case of capital intensity, the
eﬀect of these variables continues to hold conditional on a wide set of industry covariates and is
also robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcations exploiting the cross-country dimension
of the data.
There are various reasons why one should be cautious in interpreting these results as empirically
validating the property-rights theory of multinational ﬁrm boundaries. First of all, U.S. physical
capital, skill, and R&D intensity measures are imperfect proxies for headquarter intensity as they
only capture imperfectly the relative importance of the noncontractible, relationship-speciﬁci n -
vestments carried out by headquarters and their suppliers. Nunn and Treﬂer (2011) point out, for
instance, that standard measures of capital intensity embody several investments that are fairly
34I am grateful to Davin Chor, Nathan Nunn, Dan Treﬂer and Heiwai Tang for making their data available to me.
I add 0.001 to the measure of (log) R&D intensity to avoid throwing away a large number of observations with zero
R&D outlays.
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Figure 8: The Eﬀect of Headquarter Intensity on the Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports
easy to contract on or that are not particularly relationship-speciﬁc. If the property-rights theory
is correct, one would then expect investments in specialized equipment to be much more relevant
for the integration decision than investments in structures or in non-specialized equipment (such as
automobiles or computers), which tend to lose little value when not used in the intended produc-
tion process. As found by Nunn and Treﬂer (2011), Figures 9 and 10 conﬁrm that this is indeed
what one observes in the data when using disaggregated measures of capital intensity from the
U.S. Census of Manufactures. In particular, the two panels of Figure 9 depicts the partial eﬀect
of capital-equipment intensity (i.e., the ratio of capital equipment expenditures to worker wages)
and of capital-structures intensity (i.e., the ratio of expenditures on capital structures to worker
wages) in cross-industry regressions that also control for skill intensity and R&D intensity. As is
clear from the ﬁgure, the positive eﬀect of capital-equipment intensity on the share of intraﬁrm
trade is highly statistically signiﬁcant, while the eﬀect of capital-structures intensity appears to
be negative (and also statistically signiﬁcant). Figure 10 further breaks down the eﬀect of capital
equipment intensity into three components and shows that the eﬀect observed in the left panel of
Figure 9 is not driven by expenditures on computers and data processing equipment or on auto-
mobiles and trucks, which would be problematic for the theory. In fact, the eﬀect of expenditures
on automobiles and trucks appears to have a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the share of
intraﬁrm trade, which resonates with the results in Antr` as and Helpman (2008) and section 2.3.C
indicating a negative eﬀect of headquarter services contractibility on the integration decision.35
A second reason to be cautious about the ﬁndings discussed above relates to the relatively low
35Another reason that makes standard proxies for headquarter intensity problematic is the fact that they use only
information on the capital, skill or R&D intensity of the ‘selling’ industry, i.e., of the good or sector being imported.
Antr` as and Chor (2011) acknowledge this limitation and use U.S. input-output data to build measures of headquarter
intensity that reﬂect the capital intensity of the ‘average buying’ industry rather than of the selling one. This has
only a minor eﬀect on the estimates, though admittedly this might have to do with the fact that data limitations
(i.e., insuﬃcient disaggregation) prevent one from satisfactorily identifying the precise buying industry associated
with diﬀerent U.S. import purchases. For the same reason, alternative tests using measures of capital, skill or R&D
intensity of both the buying and selling industry, as developed for instance in Acemoglu et al. (2010), are typically
infeasible using U.S. intraﬁrm import data.
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Figure 10: The Eﬀect of Equipment Capital Intensity and Its Components on the Share of U.S.
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35statistical power of these tests of the property-rights theory. In other words, the patterns one
observes in the data are consistent with the property-rights theory but they are not necessarily
inconsistent with alternative theories of ﬁrm boundaries. For instance, the signiﬁcance of R&D
intensity for the integration decision of multinational ﬁrms could be viewed as a validation of
transaction-cost theories that emphasize the importance of the non-excludable nature of knowledge
in shaping multinational ﬁrm boundaries (see, for instance, Ethier and Markusen, 1996).
In order to alleviate this concern, the literature has attempted to provide more elaborate tests
of the theory that relate to the richer set of implications that arise in the property-rights theory of
the multinational ﬁrm with intraindustry heterogeneity developed by Antr` as and Helpman (2004,
2008). Remember, for instance, that these frameworks predict that the share of intraﬁrm imports
should not only increase in headquarter intensity, but should also be positively aﬀected by trade
frictions and by the degree of productivity dispersion within industries. Figure 11 conﬁrms the
empirical validity of these predictions. In the left panel of the Figure, I graphically summarize
the results in D´ ıez (2010), who unveils a positive association between the share of intraﬁrm trade
and U.S. tariﬀs in a cross-section of industries. In particular, the ﬁgure sorts industries into bins
according to their tariﬀ value (with the ﬁrst bin containing all industries for which U.S. tariﬀ are
0, and the remaining industries sorted into quartiles), and reports the median share of intraﬁrm
trade in those industries.36 The right panel of Figure 11 depicts a positive correlation between the
share of intraﬁrm trade and productivity dispersion, as measured by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), who
also show that the eﬀect of productivity dispersion is higher the higher the quintile of headquarter
intensity, a prediction that is again consistent with the property-rights framework in Antr` as and
Helpman (2004, 2008).37
A particularly promising way to discriminate the property-rights theory of the multinational
ﬁrm against alternative theories of ﬁrm boundaries consists of exploiting the implications of the
theory for the eﬀect of contractibility on the share of intraﬁrm trade. As discussed above, the
work of Antr` as and Helpman (2008) highlights that the eﬀect of contractibility on the prevalence
of integration depends crucially on the degree to which contractual incompleteness stems from
noncontractibilities in the inputs controlled by the ﬁnal-good producer or by his or her suppliers. If
production processes in certain sectors are particularly noncontractible because of the nature of the
investments carried out by headquarters, then the theory would predict that the share of intraﬁrm
trade should be negatively aﬀected by the level of these sectors’ contractibility. Conversely, if the
source of noncontractibilities stems from the nature of the supplier’s activities, the theory may
instead predict a positive correlation between the share of intraﬁrm trade and contractibility, a
result that is hard to reconcile with transaction-cost theories of multinational ﬁrm boundaries.38
36D´ ıez (2010) performs a more complete empirical analysis at the country and industry level that conﬁrms the
p o s i t i v ea s s o c i a t i o nb e t w e e nt h ep r e v a l e n c eo fi n t r a ﬁrm trade and U.S. tariﬀs. He also ﬁnds a negative correlation
between U.S. intraﬁrm imports and foreign tariﬀsa n ds h o w st h a ti tc a nb er e c o n c i l e dw i t hav a r i a n to ft h eA n t r ` as
and Helpman (2004) framework.
37The Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) measure of productivity dispersion corresponds to the standard deviation of log
exports reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce for each of the constituent HS10 products from each U.S.
location to each destination country in the year 2000.
38The qualiﬁer “may” in the previous sentence comes from the fact that improvements in contractibility also aﬀect
36Figure 11: The Implications of Heterogeneity for the Determinants of Intraﬁrm Imports
Though the theory generates sharp predictions for how the source of noncontractibilities aﬀects
the share of intraﬁrm trade, a natural challenge for empiricists is to ﬁnd appropriate proxies for
these diﬀerent sources of contractual frictions. Figure 12 depicts the correlation between two
proposed measures of contractibility and the share of intraﬁrm trade. The left panel uses the
measure of contractibility proposed by Bernard et al. (2010), which is a weighted average of the
wholesale employment share of ﬁrms importing goods in a particular sector, the idea being that
contracting is likely to be easier for products passing through intermediaries such as wholesalers.
The right panel uses Nunn’s (2007) measure of contractibility (see Nunn and Treﬂer, 2008), which
corresponds to the proportion of each sector’s intermediate inputs that are not traded on organized
exchanges and are thus more susceptible to potential contracting problems. Both panels suggest
a negative correlation between the share of intraﬁrm trade and contractibility, which is broadly in
line with what one would expect from transaction-cost models of ﬁrm boundaries, but can also be
rationalized within the property-rights theory, provided that the lack of contractibility emanates
from investments carried out by headquarter services (and possibly embodied in the good transacted
across borders). Other ﬁndings in the literature, however, appear to be harder to rationalize in
transaction-cost models, while they continue to be consistent with the property-rights approach.
For instance, both Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) and Bernard et al. (2010) ﬁnd that Nunn’s measure of
contractibility has a positive eﬀect on the share of intraﬁrm trade in regressions that incorporate
the cross-country variation in the data, suggesting that the correlation in the right panel in Figure
12 might simply reﬂect that the U.S. imports highly contractible goods from countries that export
to the U.S. mostly at arm’s-length (perhaps for other reasons). In any case, future work should
be directed at better identifying diﬀerent sources of variation in contractibility so as to better
discriminate among alternative models of multinational ﬁrm boundaries.
Throughout this section, I have focused on discussing empirical tests based on the cross-sectoral
the participation of ﬁrms in international trade and may reduce the share of intraﬁrm trade on that account. See
Antr` as and Helpman (2008) for details.
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Figure 12: The Eﬀect of Contractibility on the Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports
implications of the property-rights theory. The cross-national nature of intraﬁrm trade data nat-
urally also permits an analysis of some of the cross-country implications of the framework. For
instance, the Antr` as (2003) framework predicts that the share of intraﬁrm imports in total im-
ports should be increasing in the aggregate capital-labor ratio of the exporting country,39 while the
framework in Antr` as and Helpman (2008) might suggest that the quality of a country’s contracting
institutions might well have a positive impact on the share of intraﬁrm trade, a counterintuitive
result from the point of view of transaction-cost theories. Consistently with the ﬁndings of Antr` as
(2003), Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) and Bernard et al. (2010), the two panels in Figure 13 conﬁrm
the existence of these correlations in the data. Nevertheless, the standard concerns associated with
cross-country regressions (omitted variable biases, endogeneity, etc.) apply here as well, so one
should be cautious in interpreting these correlations as formal validations of the theory. Nunn and
Treﬂer (2008) and Bernard et al. (2010) also experiment with the addition of controls that interact
country and industry variables, but it is not always easy to map these results to the simple models
that have been developed so far.40
Due to data availability, the bulk of work using product-level data to test the property-rights
theory has employed U.S. intraﬁrm import data. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) and Fernandes and
Tang (2010) are two notable exceptions that instead use Chinese data (see also Feenstra, 2011, for
an overview). In particular, product-level export data from the Customs General Administration
of the People’s Republic of China contain detailed information on whether the exporter is a foreign-
owned plant or not. It is not clear that foreign-owned plants will necessarily export their output
to aﬃliated parties (thus generating intraﬁrm trade), but regardless the data are suitable for an
analysis of the determinants of foreign ownership of suppliers in China. Both sets of authors
39The Antr` as and Helpman (2004) framework would also generate the same prediction if wages in the exporting
country are positively aﬀected by that country’s aggregate capital-labor ratio.
40For instance, Bernard et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the share of intraﬁrm trade is increasing in the interaction of
physical capital abundance and physical capital intensity, whereas in Antr` as (2003), conditional on capital intensity,
the incentive to integrate suppliers is independent of factor prices (and thus of physical capital abundance).
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Figure 13: Cross-Country Determinants of the Share of U.S. Intraﬁrm Imports
also make use of the fact that the data distinguish between diﬀerent types of customs regimes
(pure-assembly or import-and-assembly), depending on whether the plant in China is in charge of
importing inputs or that responsibility falls to a foreign producer). This motivates the development
of rich variants of the property-rights theory, which appear to be able to successfully account for
the patterns observed in the data.
4.2 Tests with Firm-Level Data
The property-rights theory is a theory of ﬁrm boundaries and thus ﬁrm-level data would appear to
be the ideal laboratory to use in testing it. An obvious limitation, however, is that this type of data
are not readily available. Recent studies have, however, unveiled the existence of a few ﬁrm-level
datasets that can help shed some light on the empirical relevance of the property-rights theory. In
this section, I will focus on describing four of these ﬁrm-level datasets (those that I am aware of),
while discussing both their main advantages and limitations, and outlining some of the results that
have been obtained when exploiting these datasets.
The ﬁrst paper to use ﬁrm-level data to assess the validity of the property-rights theory of
multinational ﬁrm boundaries is Tomiura (2007), who uses data from the Basic Survey of Com-
mercial and Manufacturing Structure and Activity in Japan. The survey covers 118,300 Japanese
manufacturing ﬁrms and according to author, “is regarded as an accurate overall representation of
the whole of manufacturing in Japan,” though unfortunately it was carried out only in one year,
1998. The survey contains various data on the operations of ﬁrms (sales, employment, capital ex-
penditures, exports, foreign direct investment) and crucially also asks ﬁrms whether they “contract
out manufacturing or processing tasks to other ﬁrms overseas.” Hence, the survey can be used to
explicitly distinguish ﬁrms that are engaged in foreign outsourcing versus those that are engaged in
foreign direct investment. A key limitation of the data is that they do not appear to contain infor-
mation on the volumes (i.e., the intensive margin) of foreign insourcing and outsourcing. Tomiura
39(2007) uses the dataset to show that, consistently with the sorting predicted by the Antr` as and
Helpman (2004) model, ﬁrms that are engaged in FDI are distinctively more productive than ﬁrms
that are engaged in foreign outsourcing, which in turn are more productive than domestic ﬁrms. No
other predictions from the model are tested. An interesting feature of the data is that most ﬁrms
are neither “pure FDI” ﬁrms nor “pure outsourcing” ﬁrms, which suggests that current models are
too stylized to capture the rich organizational decisions of ﬁrms.
A second line of papers, most notably Defever and Toubal (2007), Corcos et al. (forthcoming)
and Carluccio and Fally (forthcoming) have used French data from the EIIG (´ Echanges Interna-
tionaux Intra-Groupe), a survey conducted in 1999 by the SESSI (Service des ´ Etudes Statistiques
Industrielles), which documents the sourcing mode (through independent suppliers or through af-
ﬁliates) of each ﬁrm’s yearly imports of intermediate inputs by origin country and by four-digit
HS product codes in 1999. The survey includes all French ﬁrms that trade more than 1 million
euros and that are owned by manufacturing groups that control at least ﬁfty percent of the equity
capital of an aﬃliate based outside France. Though not all ﬁrms responded to the survey, the 4,305
responding ﬁrms represent more than 80% of total exports and imports of French multinationals
in 1999.41 A key limitation of the EEIG dataset is the potential for sample selection biases arising
from including only ﬁrms with at least one aﬃliate outside France. Corcos et al. (forthcoming)
acknowledge this problem and complement the dataset with data coming from the French Cus-
toms Oﬃce, documenting the universe of yearly imports and exports ﬂows in 1999 at the ﬁrm,
origin country and product level, hence allowing them to oﬀer a more representative picture of
the foreign outsourcing operations of French ﬁrms. The goals and scope of the papers using the
EEIG dataset are somewhat diﬀerent, but they all ﬁnd supportive evidence of a positive correlation
between headquarter intensity and the relative importance of intraﬁrm trade, with the measures
of headquarter intensity in Corcos et al. (forthcoming) being a ﬁrm-level measure (namely, capital
intensity, skill intensity and the ratio of value added over sales of the importing ﬁrm). Another
conclusion that emerges from these studies is that selection bias identiﬁed by Corcos et al. (forth-
coming) appears to be important in the sense that the productivity advantage of FDI ﬁrms over
foreign outsourcers predicted by the theory (see Figure 1) arises only when including ﬁrms that
only engage in outsourcing into the analysis.
More recently, the property-rights theory of the multinational ﬁrm has been tested using ﬁrm-
level data from Spain provided by the Fundaci´ on SEPI. In particular, Kohler and Smolka (2009)
make use of the ESEE (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales), which surveys approximately
2,000 Spanish ﬁrms with at least ten employees on a yearly basis since 1990 and provides information
on their income and balance sheet statistics, and also on a variety of more speciﬁc organizational
variables. A notable characteristic of the ESEE is its representativeness, which is ensured by the
careful statistical criteria used in the initial year of the sample and the special attention that has
been given to account for entry and exit of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes in subsequent years. For the
41This data source can in turn be matched with another SESSI database, the EAE (Enquˆ e t eA n n u e l l eE n t r e p r i s e ) ,
which provides balance sheet data on manufacturing ﬁrms with at least 20 employees.
40purposes of testing the property-rights theory, a particularly relevant feature of the data is that they
allow one to compute the overall spending on intermediate inputs by ﬁrms and their breakup into
(i) domestic purchases from independent suppliers, (ii) domestic purchases from aﬃliated parties,
(iii) imports from foreign independent suppliers, and (iv) imports from foreign aﬃliates. Hence,
one can easily map some of the variables of the survey into the key equilibrium variables in existing
models, such as the Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) frameworks with intraindustry heterogeneity.
An important disadvantage of this Spanish dataset is that it only distinguishes between domestic
and foreign input purchases, with the latter not being disaggregated by country of origin. Kohler
and Smolka (2009) use the ESEE dataset and ﬁnd evidence supportive of the productivity sorting
of ﬁrms into organizational forms predicted by the Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008) models (see
Figure 1). In particular, conditional on the location of sourcing (domestic or foreign), integrating
ﬁrms appear to be more productive than nonintegrating ones, and they also provide evidence that
ﬁrms outsourcing abroad appear to be slightly more productive than ﬁrms integrating in Spain.
Furthermore, Kohler and Smolka (2009) ﬁnd that higher levels of ﬁrm-level capital intensity and
skill intensity are associated with higher intraﬁrm shares in both domestic and foreign intermediate
input purchases, and also that the eﬀect of productivity on the choice between integration and
outsourcing, both at home and abroad, is observed only at high capital intensity levels, again
consistently with the predictions in Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008).
A ﬁnal international ﬁrm-level dataset that has been used to shed light on the property-rights
theory is Dun & Bradstreet’s WorldBase database, which contains public and private plant-level
observations in more than 200 countries and territories. The dataset does not contain an awful
lot of operational data related to these plants, but as pointed out by Alfaro et al. (2010), it
does oﬀer a comprehensive picture of ﬁrm boundaries across borders. In particular, it contains
detailed information on the location, ownership (e.g., its domestic or global parent) and industry
classiﬁcation for hundreds of thousands of plants worldwide. Alfaro et al. (2010) use these data
to document a positive association between higher tariﬀso nﬁnal products (as measured by MFN
tariﬀs at the four-digit SIC industry level for all WTO members) and an index of domestic vertical
integration constructed with the ownership information in the Dun & Bradstreet’s WorldBase
database and input-output tables. The empirical exercise exploits both cross-section and time-
series variation in trade policy, as well as a more signiﬁcant trade liberalization episode, namely
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. The authors take these results as empirically validating the
model of organizational design in Legros and Newman (2009) and Conconi et al. (forthcoming),
but they are also consistent with the ﬁndings in Antr` as and Helpman (2004, 2008).
4.3 Road Ahead
The ﬁndings of the studies I have described in this section are interesting and oﬀer broad support
for some of the key predictions of the property-rights theory of multinational ﬁrm boundaries.
Nevertheless, the evidence is far from conclusive because, for the most part, the tests that have
been performed up to now have relatively low statistical power. In my view, successful testing of
41the theory will need to follow one of the two following approaches.
A ﬁrst possibility is to better exploit the large variation in the relative prevalence of integration
retrievable from intraﬁrm trade data, and most notably, from U.S. intraﬁrm import data. In
particular, the cross-industry studies that I have described above are interesting and informative but
they cannot convincingly identify a causal eﬀect of headquarter intensity (even when appropriately
measured) on the share of intraﬁrm trade. A potential avenue for future research is to use narrower
slices of the data, perhaps (i) focusing on the patterns in a single industry, but exploiting exogenous
changes in sector characteristics driven by technological or demand-driven shocks, in the spirit of
Baker and Hubbard (2003), or perhaps (ii) performing analyses exploiting within-country variation
stemming from changes in the institutional characteristics of countries, such as observable changes
in the quality of institutions or in restrictions on foreign ownership in those countries.
A second, and perhaps even more fruitful area of future research, entails a more structural use of
the available ﬁrm-level datasets. At present, little work has been devoted to structurally estimating
the models I have discussed in this survey. This is partly due to the stylized nature of some of
these frameworks, and partly due to the under-utilization of this type of empirical techniques in the
international trade ﬁeld. Yet, as I have argued in section 3.4, future theoretical developments are
likely to provide much richer property-rights frameworks that will be more amenable for structural
work. Part of the appeal of using this set of techniques is that this might permit an evaluation of
the quantitative importance of multinational ﬁrm boundaries for ﬁrm-level performance, a question
that so far has not been suﬃciently explored in the literature.42
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, I have surveyed the inﬂuence of Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal paper for the
study of the international organization of production. I have discussed the implementation of the
theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the structure of international trade
ﬂows and multinational activity. I have also reviewed empirical work suggestive of the empirical
relevance of the property-rights theory. Along the way, I have developed novel theoretical results
and have also outlined some of the key limitations of existing contributions.
I want to conclude by brieﬂy discussing the broader impact of GH in the ﬁeld of international
trade. First, as emphasized earlier in this paper, GH has been an inspiration for the development
of various complementary theories of the organization of production, some of which have also been
put to work both theoretically and empirically in open-economy environments (see, for instance,
the references described at the end of section 3.3 above). These papers may not be direct oﬀspring
of GH, but they clearly carry some of GH’s traits.
Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, soon after the development of property-rights theories of multina-
tional ﬁrm boundaries, the literature acknowledged that incomplete contracting of the type intro-
duced by GH could shape not only the ownership structure of ﬁrms but also their geographical
42The work of Guadalupe, Kuzmina and Thomas (forthcoming) is a ﬁrst promising step in that direction.
42location. In other words, contracting institutions are not only important for understand vertical
integration decisions, but they also constitute a source of comparative advantage. The literature
on trade and institutions has exploded in the last few years, with work studying both theoretically
as well as empirically the eﬀects of contracting, ﬁnancial and labor market institutions on trade
patterns, multinational activity, and more broadly the impact of these institutions on the workings
of general equilibrium models.43 The main ideas behind these papers can all be traced back in
some form or other to the seminal work of GH.
Finally, by formalizing the idea of power in market and non-market economic transactions,
the ideas in GH have been shown to have new and interesting implications for how the process
of globalization aﬀects diﬀerent agents in society (depending on their endowments of assets or
information), and also for how the eﬀects of trade policies are transmitted across countries, with
implications for the eﬃcacy of the rules that currently govern negotiations at the World Trade
Organization (see, among others, Antr` as and Costinot, 2011, Antr` as and Staiger, forthcoming).
43See, among many others, Acemoglu et al. (2007), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) on contracting institutions,
Antr` as and Caballero (2007), Antr` as et al. (2009), and Manova (2010) on ﬁnancial institutions, and Helpman et al.
(2010) on labor-market institutions.
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Derivation of Equation (8) Due to () being homogeneous of degree ,w ec a nw r i t e
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while the formula for the elasticity of substitution between  and  is given by
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Now plugging these expressions into (3) using (4) and (5) delivers
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Straightforward diﬀerentiation conﬁrms that 
∗ is increasing in  and decreasing in  for any   0
(remember that   0,   0a n d +  = ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 Following the algebra in Antr` as and Helpman (2008), it can easily be veriﬁed
that when  obtains a share of revenue  in the ex-post bargaining, the equilibrium level of revenues is
given by
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44Using equations (1) and (9), the relative proﬁts obtained by  under integration versus outsourcing are then
given by
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To characterize the eﬀects of the diﬀerent parameters on this ratio of proﬁts, it is simplest to work with the
following monotonic transformation of  :
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Simple diﬀerentiation shows that Θ() is a decreasing function of , and thus the relative prof-
itability of integration is higher, the tighter are ﬁnancial constraints (i.e., the lower is ). We next show that
Θ() is also increasing in  and decreasing in .
We begin by noting that
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so it suﬃces to show that Θ() ≥ 0w h e n =0a n dΘ() ≤ 0w h e n =0 .
One can verify however that
Θ()

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
=l n( 1+)−ln
µ
1+ + (1 − )(1− )
1+(1 − )
¶
−
2(1 − )
2
(1 + (1 − ))(1 +  + (1 − )(1− ))
≥ 0,
where the sign follows from the right-hand-side being increasing in  and equalling 0 when  = 0. Similarly,
we have
Θ()

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
=l n( 1− )−ln
µ
(1 − )+( 1+)(1− )
1 −  + 
¶
+
2(1 − )
2
(1 −  + )(1−  +  +  − − )
≤ 0,
where the sign follows now from the right-hand-side being decreasing in  (which can be veriﬁed via diﬀer-
entiation) and equalling 0 when  =0 .
Next note that for suﬃciently high ,w em u s th a v eΘ()  0. This can be veriﬁed analytically
but it suﬃces to point out that this is true when  = 1 (see Proposition 2) and the function Θ(·)i sd e c r e a s i n g
in .C o n v e r s e l y ,f o rs u ﬃciently low , i.e.,  → 0, we have
Θ() → (1 − )ln
µ
(1 + )+(1 − )(1− )
1+(1 − )
¶
+  ln((1 − )),
which is negative for suﬃciently high , but may be positive for suﬃciently low  ( t h i si se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed
by setting  = 0, for instance). In sum, given that  is increasing in , we can conclude that there
exists a headquarter-intensity cutoﬀ ˆ  ∈ [01) such that for all   ˆ , integration necessarily dominates
45outsourcing. When ˆ   0, outsourcing dominates integration for all   ˆ  b u tn o t et h a ti ti sp o s s i b l e
that ˆ  = 0 and thus integration dominates outsourcing for all  ∈ (01). Finally, given the comparative
statics discussed above, we can use the implicit function theorem to conclude that the cutoﬀ ˆ  is lower the
larger is  and the smaller is .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 We ﬁrst derive the formulas for the ex-post payoﬀso ft h eﬁrm and the suppliers.
To compute the Shapley value for supplier , ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h eﬁrm is an essential player in the bargaining
game and thus a supplier’s marginal contribution is equal to zero when a coalition does not include the ﬁrm.
When it does include the ﬁrm and a measure  of suppliers, the marginal contribution of supplier  is equal
to ()=(mn),w h e r e(mn)=
¡R 
0 ()
¢ 
 .T h i sp r o d u c e s
()=


(−)

µ
()
(−)
¶

−
 ,
where (−) represents the (symmetric) investments of all suppliers other than  and where in the second
equality we have used the fact that supplier investments will be symmetric in equilibrium.
The Shapley value of supplier  is the average of her marginal contributions to coalitions that consist of
players ordered below her in all feasible orderings. A supplier that has a measure  of players ordered below
her has a marginal contribution of ()i ft h eﬁrm is ordered below her (probability )a n d0o t h e r w i s e
(probability 1 − ). Averaging over all possible orderings of the players and using the above formula for
() we obtain:
 ((−)()) =
Z 1
0
() =

 + 
(−)

µ
()
(−)
¶
,
which corresponds to (12). In the case of vertical integration, the marginal contribution of a supplier is
reduced by a factor 1 −  and so is her ﬁnal payoﬀ, thus resulting in (13).
Denote by  the share of revenue accruing to the ﬁrm under the (symmetric) ownership structure
 ∈ {},s o = ( + )a n d =(  + )( + ). From equations (12) and (13) and
imposing symmetry, we have that equilibrium input choices satisfy
()
−1 ()
−1 = 
(1 − )()
 ()
−1 = 
Combining these equations, we have that joint proﬁts are given by
 =( 1−  − (1 − ))1(1−−)
µ


¶(1−−) µ
(1 − )

¶(1−−)
.
Computing the ratio of proﬁts under integration and outsourcing, taking logarithms and multiplying by
1 −  −   0 we can write
Θ()=( 1 −  − )ln
µ


¶
=( 1 −  − )ln
µ
( + ) − ( + ) −  (1 − )
 (1 − )+(1 − )
¶
+  ln
µ
( + )

¶
+  ln(1 − )
46Straightforward diﬀerentiation delivers:
2 (Θ())

=
( + +1− )( + )(1− )()
2
(( + ) − ( + ) −  (1 − ))
2 ( + )
 0
while it is also easily veriﬁed that
Θ()

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
=0 .
Which implies that
Θ()
 ≥ 0a n dt h er e l a t i v ep r o ﬁtability of integration is increasing in .
We next focus on the eﬀect of  on the integration decision. Note ﬁrst that
lim
→0
Θ()=( 1−  − )ln(1− )+ lim
→0
µ
ln
µ
1+


¶¶
+  ln(1 − )=+ ∞,
and
Θ(1) = (1 − )ln(1+)+ ln(1 − )  0,
where the last expression is negative because it is decreasing in  and equals 0 at  =0 .H e n c e ,
integration dominates outsourcing for suﬃciently low , and the converse is true for a high
enough . To demonstrate the existence of a unique threshold as stated in Proposition 4, note
that
 (Θ())

= ∆
∙
2 + 
( (1 − ) −  (1 − ))(1 −  − ) −  (1 −  (1 − ) − )
(1 −  − )(1− )
−

(1 −  − )
¸
,
(18)
with
∆ =
()
2  (1 −  − )(1− )
( + )( +  −  ( + ) − (1 − ))( (1 − )+(1 − ))
 0.
Note that the term in brackets in (18) constitutes a quadratic equation in  of the form 2++,
with 0. This implies, however, that it can only take a value of 0 at most once for 0.
Together with the limiting values lim→0 Θ()=+ ∞ and Θ(1)  0, we can thus conclude
that Θ(ˆ ) = 0 for a unique value ˆ  ∈ (01), as stated in the Proposition.
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